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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL: Welcome to the hearing of the Senate Committee on 
Energy & Public Utilities. Let me introduce Senator Newt Russell to you, staff, Ann 
Gressani and Patti Stearns on my right. 
Today we are examining proposed new energy projects which promise greater competition 
with our regulated utilities. This morning we will be talking about the market for natural 
gas, and the various proposals to serve substantial new volumes of gas to Kern County, the 
site of our heavy oil fields. 
Internationally, the eyes of gas producers are on our own Kern County. The oil 
companies are sitting on massive reserves of heavy oil and in order to produce that oil 
within air quality goals, the oil companies will be buying a tremendous amount of new gas. 
The prospect of this new market delights gas producers all across the United States and 
Canaua because they're sitting on a glut of natural gas and desperately seek new markets. 
It sounds like a perfect match, doesn't it? Remember when it sounded like a great 
idea to break up Ma Bell? I'm afraid the analogy is painfully accurate. Competition in 
gas like competition in telecommunications, is leading to producers falling over each 
other with breaks for big industrial customers--customers big enough that they will 
not even need the traditional utility system to serve them. And left holding the bag for 
the built-in fixed costs of the utility system are our residential ratepayers, the custo-
mers too small to leave the regulated utilities. 
Today we will be looking into this threatened new form of potential "bypass" and try 
to find methods of protecting our ratepayer/constituents before the horses are out of the 
barn. We still have time to examine the needs in Kern County and set up conditions for 
new gas that will not harm existing utility customers. 
Our first speaker this morning with one plan to serve gas to Kern County was to be 
Don Vial, President of the California PUC, who will be here. His plane was late leaving 
San Francisco this morning. I understand the plane has probably landed at LAX and it will 
be a little while before he gets here. At this time, I also invite to the front of the 
room the panel discussants who will be able to react to the various gas supply proposals 
and raise pertinent questions. The discussants represent the utilities, Energy Commission, 
and oil companies. 
So why don't we have the oil company representatives come up front here and also the 
discussants, Mr. Gandara Mr. Satrap, Fred John, Terry Thorn. To begin with I've got to 
have kind of a brief description and overview of what EOR is and how you think we should 
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deal with it. And gentlemen, please, we're late in starting so I'm going to ask all of 
the persons speaking to not read long statements, tell us briefly what it is you want to 
say so that we can move the hearing along. If it appears that people are a little bit too 
windy, I will be take the prerogative of the chair to shorten your presentation. 
Joining us, Senator Barry Keene, a member of the committee. And so you haven't 
missed anything except my opening remarks. All right, gentlemen, somebody, Don Reisner, 
you want to introduce the persons who will tell us what EOR is? 
MR. DON REISNER: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Don Reisner representing 11 oil 
companies. I have with me today two witnesses: One representing Chevron and another 
representing Shell. Witness Mr. Reichardt, Terry Reichardt will discuss from Chevron's 
point of view what the EOR process is. Mr. Knowles is here to answer any questions as 
to how that process pertains to Shell. There are obviously differences from one company to 
the next. They are slight so we're prepared to give you a little overview of the whole 
thing. This time I'd like to present Mr. Reichardt. 
MR. TERRY REICHARDT: Good morning. My name is Terry Reichardt. I am manager for 
production engineering for the Western production region of Chevron, USA. In my opening 
remarks I will comment briefly on what EOR is. I will discuss what the alternative--a 
little bit of information on alternative fuels which will lead us to the conclusion, I hope, 
that gas is a very desirable fuel for the EOR projects. And I will talk a little bit 
about what the producer requirements are for a satisfactory supply of gas for those 
projects. 
To begin with, what is EOR? EOR stands for "enhanced oil recovery." It's sometimes 
referred to a TEOR or "tertiary enhanced oil recivery." EOR applies to a number of 
processes that are used to produce oil from reservoirs after primary recovery and/or con-
ventional secondary recovery processes. Included in the numerous EOR processes is the 
use of steam to recover heavy oils. Heavy oils are very thick and viscous at normal 
reservoir temperatures. It is very difficult for those oils to flow through a reservoir 
and into a producing well. The fact that they are very viscous makes that flow difficult. 
Sometimes there is no recovery at all through conventional producing means in recovering 
heavy oils from reservoirs. 
One of the methods that is used to encouarge the oils to flow through the reservoir 
is the use of heat in the form of steam. That subject is what has brought us together 
today. Senator Rosenthal earlier said that EOR is all about making heavy oils thin and 
l very much agree with that view on the subject. I kind of think of it as making oils 
that behave almost like a solid into an oil that behaves much more like a liquid. The way 
a steam drive works is that steam is pumped through an injection well and into a producing 
rock. It has then the capability of heating up the very thick oils and make it easier for 
them to flow, then the steam also provides pressure to displace the oils towards pro-
ducing wells. 
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cost of the fuel to turn the water into steam. We need a price at the burner tip that is 
competitive with the price of burning crude oil. We need a long-term assurance that 
prices will be competitive with crude oil, again, in order to embark upon the major ex-
penditures that are required. Third, we need uninterruptible service. A steam drive is 
a continuous process. There are several detrimental things than can happen if interrup-
tions occur during the process. When a steam injection well goes down, wellboard damage 
can happen. We can have backflow from the formation into the well which would plug up the 
well and result in decreased recoveries from the reservoir. We also,when we have inter-
ruptions, have a period of time when the reservoir can cool down. This will then take 
additional heat to catch up after the process begins again and the economics, as I men-
tioned, are highly dependent upon the fuel costs so we don't like to have period when any 
heat can escape or not be used in driving, in lessening the viscosity of the oil in 
driving it to the producing wells. And a third reason we need an uninterruptible supply 
is that when we do have an interruption we do have reservoirs where the production will 
drop dramatically, and when we do have interruptions in the production, that very adversely 
effects the economics of the project. 
So in conclusion, those are the three key requirements we have for gas in order to 
find that to be a satisfactory long-term fuel for the EOR projects. That concludes my 
opening remarks on the EOR projects. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Do you have anything to add which is significantly 
different? 
MR. DON KNOWLES: No, I would like to comment primarily in terms of our gas require-
ments and that sort of thing that Mr. Reichardt---my name is Don Knowles, I'm with Shell 
California in Bakersfield. 
I would simply echo his comments as to the process, how it works. I think it's been 
well described for the committee this morning and in other forums. To put it into per-
spective, Shell's requirements, Shell California produces over 200,000 barrels of oil a 
day in California, and of that 150,000 barrels a day is produced in Central California, 
primarily in Kern County. 
Our EOR recovery process is the same as Mr. Reichardt described that of introduction 
of heating the reservoir by way of steam generation. We currently require 100 to 150 mil-
lion cubic feet per day of gas as fuel for our generators and we anticipate that that 
requirement could increase to over 200 million cubic feet per day by 1990. 
Again, the primary requirements that Mr. Reichardt set out are reliability of service, 
uninterruptibility, cost competitive at the burner tip, because after all our truly al-
ternative fuel is that of burning heavy crude. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL; Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL: Will you get getting into the issue of why the current 
system does not provide you with those kinds guarantees, prices and so forth? 
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MR. REISNER: Senator, I think we will be available to respond to that after the 
alternative methods of delivering the gas are described by the various projects. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Fine. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I'll ask you now to 
make the seats available to Terry Thorn, Vice President of Mohave Pipeline, Walter Gerlach 
Vice President of PGC Interstate Transmission Company, and Jared Carter, Counsel to the 
Kern River Gas Transmission Company. 
Let me just throw out a question to the gentlemen from the pipelines which you might 
be able to answer when you're making your presentation. Why is it in the ratepayers' 
interest to allow private pipelines serve the cream industrial EOR market? 
MR. TERENCE H. THORN: I left a rather dreary, chilly Fall day in Washington last 
nigl1t to come to beautiful Southern California. I don't know what you did with your 
weather, but ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Liquid sunshine. 
MR. THORN: Let me briefly describe the Mohave Pipeline project. As the Chairman 
said, my name is Terry Thorn. I am the Vice President of the Mojave Pipeline Operating 
Company. 
The Mohave ect was filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on 
15 985, as a purpose pipeline to transport natural gas to EOR fields in 
California. It is 383 miles in length. It originates in Topock, Arizona and will cost 
well 
$320 million to build. 
I like to dispell the notion that one morning the combined management of Mohave 
ine woke up and decided to build an interstate pipeline into California. Like any 
of this magnitude, Mohave has been carefully thought out, was 
in response to a market need, and its success or failure will depend on how 
continues to meet the needsof its customers. 
Now, what are these market needs? You've heard from the producer panel. Quickly, it 
makes sense to burn natural gas in these fields for two points: It's more efficient and 
it solves some of the environmental problems associated with expanding this production. 
, under the current regulatory scheme, burning more gas in these fields is not 
for two reasons: One, the reliability of service--these loads will be cur-
tailed ; and secondly, the fluctuation in price. Right now, for the long-term type 
investments needed to these fields, the price assurity is just not there. 
So to summarize then, without a reliable supply of gas at a predictable price, 
EOR have not been willing to risk the considerable investments required to 
convert their EOR operations from burning portions of the oil produced to natural gas. 
Mohave was conceived and is positioned to receive gas from anywhere in North 
America,to serve a single class of customers with no risk of curtailment, and to deliver 
this gas at a very economic and very predictable rate. 
Now a lot of things have happened in California, especially in the context of the 
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CPUC, and I was hoping that Mr. Vial would have preceded me. The proposed transportation 
program singles out EOR markets and there is actually probably five important parts of 
this program that are especially targeted for this market--the 25 million cubic feet a 
year requirement, the 3.5 cents per therm rate, five-year contract duration, 50 percent 
take or pay requirements, and a promise to revisit the priority problem at a later date. 
You have heard, well, you have not heard yet, but in reviewing the comments of the 
EOR producers in response to the transportation order, they raised several problems. One, 
it does nothing about the low priority status afforded that low. Two, future commissions 
may modify what this commission does in protecting that market, and three, the price still 
fluctuates too much, especially by tying it to the CPl. The price of housing could go 
up, therefore the cost of gas EOR fields could go up. 
The consumer groups have raised other issues, in fact, a much broader issue where 
they are asking that everyone carefully weight the benefits to consumers of utility 
service to this market. I think if you look at their comments it is not as clear cut as 
people would maintain. In other words, is it worth turning the entire regulatory scheme 
in California on its head just to ensure that the EOR market is served by local utilities? 
This might be the classic case of the tail wagging the dog. I don't know. 
The conclusion is that Mohave was conceived and is designed to serve a new incre-
mental market for natural gas. It offers firm price and reliable service. It's objective 
is not to capture markets whichthe utilities are best able to serve, but in the context of 
today's markets and even under the new regulatory environment and the proposed order, we 
believe there is still a need and a place for Mohave Pipeline. That concludes my comments. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Question, Senator Russell? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Just after deregulation took place there were attempts to nullify 
contracts that had been developed during the scarcity period and work that out. Now if 
you have a long-term 20-year contract, how would those kinds of circumstances affect that 
contract, or would they? 
MR. THORN: Well, Senator, they wouldn't. Mohave Pipeline is unique in the Federal 
regulatory scheme. We are a transporter of gas. We will not buy any gas, we will not 
sell any gas. The customer is the EOR producers who purchase gas. Whether they will 
move their own supplies from around the country into California or they will go into the 
marketplace and buy gas, those contracts will be between them and the producing source. 
We merely transport the gas so we don't have that contract problem. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, I understand that but you won't have a pipeline either if the 
purchasers of this gas can't get some kind of an arrangement. My question was for them--
maybe I'm directing it to the wrong person--how would those kinds of circumstances affect 
the long-term contract because Southern California Gas Company was doing everything they 
could and others to change those long-term contracts which when they were developed and 
signed was the wisdom of the day, but things changed and they were trying to get out from 
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under. Is there such a thing as a 20-year guaranteed price? Haybe I ought to ask 
Southern California Gas or here, I'll ask this fellow over here. Mr. John? 
MR. FRED JOHN: Yes, Senator. As far as the price that would be set by the Public 
Utilities Commission, obviously, that is subject to change. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Under this scenario? 
MR. JOHN: I think the scenario they're talking about, but it really should be left 
to the producers, is I think what the producers are saying is they would have their own 
that they've developed in other areas of the country, primarily the Southwestern 
United States and possibly even Canada, and it would be those supplies that would enter 
the San Joaquin Valley and the utility or the pipeline company would merely be the 
transporters. So it's different from a contract that a distributor like us would sign 
with a pipeline company or produce. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So if this pipeline is built and you buy from the producers---I 
guess you wouldn't buy it either. 
MR. JOHN: I think what you've got to understand in this situation the producer often-
imes is also the customer. He's the end-user as well as the producer. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay, well, at the right time, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to find out 
how permanent or how guaranteed is a 20-year contract under the fluctuating situations of 
our economy and regulatory bodies, and so forth, whenever that comes up. 
~m. JOHN: On that point, though, Senator, I think it should be noted and unfortunately 
Commissioner Vial isn' here to talk about his own decision, but I think what the Com-
mission's tried to do in their decision is establish a price to the EOR producer that will 
luctuate in a minimal fashion, and it's a base rate and it's ties to fluctuations in 
u To say that there's going to be a price forever and that's it, I think 
t your question, and that's probably not in the scheme of things. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, if you say 20 years is in the scheme of things, okay. I 
don't think it's forever but ... 
CHAIR¥~ ROSENTHAL: Well, maybe we'll have an answer to that a little bit later. Let 
another question that you might want to deal with. What are your intentions 
non-EOR customers? 
MR. THORN: Mohave was conceived and was filed with the FERC as a single purpose 
p to serve just the EOR market. There's no intention of the management to serve 
any other load other than the producers associated with EOR. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is there a guarantee of that? 
MR. THORN: As much as anything is guaranteed. I might add that the partnership 
agreement as drawn up between PacificLighting and El Paso Natural Gas and HNG Internorth 
is that it would take a unanimous vote of the partners to serve any load other than 
EOR markets. I think that ilyou look carefully at that partnership, I think that it 
would not be likely as much as that is guaranteed that that unanimous vote would occur. 
-7-
CHAIRPAN ROSENTHAL: Well, I guess, let me ask Pacific Lighting then. If you used 
your veto to block service to non-EOR customers, would you not be running afoul of the 
antitrust laws? 
MR. JOHN: Senator, I don't want to beg the question, but I'm here representing 
Southern California Gas Company. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
MR. JOHN: There will be a spokesman here tomorrow from Pacific Lighting Corporation 
who can address any questions you have about Hohave. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How about Hr. Thorn? Could you answer that particular question? 
From your viewpoint? 
MR. THORN: Well, from my viewpoint a management decision on how you run your 
business, I guess that faces the same risk that the California Public Utilities Cow~ission 
would have legally in carving out a special rate or a special service to just the EOR 
producers. They have the same problem. Would they end up in court? To be honest, right 
now l can't answer that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How about the---wouldn't you actually be competing then with 
other lines coming into California which are now providing the oil companies with some of 
the gas now? 
MR. THORN: That is our intent, to compete for this market. You have to understand 
that if we receive our certificate of approval in the Spring of 1987 that there's no 
guarantee that the pipeline will be built. We will look at the market conditions. My 
management will not decide if the pipeline is built. EOR producers will decide if the 
pipeline is built and if in the next 18 months they have signed significant contracts with 
the existing utilities or with other pipelines, then we'll have to make the economic 
judgment in 1987 that there's no long a place for Hohave. We are here to compete for that 
load and the marketplace will decide whether Hohave is built. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Do you have anything further? 
MR. JARED G. CARTER: Yes, I do, Senator. Jared Carter is my name. I'm representing 
Kern River Gas Transmission Company. Perhaps in the absence of Commissioner Vial having 
explained his proposal, it would be helpful for me before I start talking about our 
proposal to just take a minute. I gave each one of you a little map and if you open that 
up it has transposed on it the various p ines involved, as well as the various supply 
areas involved. The supply areas are the little hatched or dotted areas on the map. 
At the present time, California is served by the pipelines running in along the 
south from the supply areas in the south and the southwest that you see. To a certain 
extent you have PG&E's line, PGT, coming down from the Alberta area down through Washing-
ton and Oregon into California. What Kern River proposes is the blue line that you see 
which vJi ll hook up with Northwest Pipeline's exist system that you see running from 
the Washington area in a general southeasterly direction down to what's called the 
San Juan Field and it hooks up with British Columbia and Alberta Supply. 
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It also, and here's the distinctive feature it, will hook into the large, 
undedicated reserves in the area that you see there in the Rocky Mountains. That's the 
new feature that that 
what the CPUC has done, and I understood the reason, the purpose for these 
is that they've come out with a proposal to allow or to--it's dressed up as 
allowing PG&E and Southern California Gas to pick up gas from El Paso and 
Transwestern at the California border and transport it. That means they don't buy it as 
do now but transport it for a fee through their systems to the fields in Kern 
One of the reasons behind their order was to keep an interstate pipe-
line out of California. In other words, what you have here is an attempt by the CPUC to 
further 
state p 
policy ectives of PG&E and Southern California Gas to keep out any inter-
from California, and their theory is, and I'm confident that they mean well, 
is that that's 
allow the 
to be for consumers because in the long-run no competition will 
utilities to the costs over their system to everyone's benefit. 
I'm going to turn to my statement now and comment on this arrangement. I've submitted 
some that I'm not to read. It responds to the questions that you've asked. 
What we propose to do, as I mentioned is to build this line from Opal Wyoming to 
Bakersfield, California to transport to the EOR market gas from the prolific, undedicated 
supplies in the Rocky Mountains. Those are not now being used to serve Califor-
nia. 're adequate to meet the demand of the EOR market and they are available on 
terms to the EOR ' needs. 
it's our ion that of the EOR production by the use of 
natural gas will very substantial economic and environmental benefits for all of 
California. Those benefits can be realized, however, only if the gas the 
system to the can be implemented. Kern River is the only 
ect we believe can meet this test and by bringing competition and a new delivery 
and new sources of to the state, Kern River will benefit all of California's 
consumers not just EOR , more than will any of the competing projects. This 
most ec t by the CPUC in it's October 17 order. 
Let me why 
ion is not. We 
is valid and why the key points in favor of the 
ect in response to the desires of the EOR pro-
ducers. Those desires have not changed. In its comments on the October 17 
order the CPUC, Chevron, USA stated, and let me quote that, "Although there will 
be situations where thermal EOR operators would find the proposal useful," 
that CPUC , "it s not adequate as a comprehensive solution to the 
needs EOR fuel. It fails to provide satisfactory safeguards for the two 
or 
interstate p 
of supply ive , and it is thus not competitive with 
s." That's the end of Chevron's quote. 
We will continue to propose an interstate project if the producers continue to hold 
these views. An interstate ect will be free from changeable CPUC ions and 
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it will assure to all Californians the benefit of competition in the California market-
place. This is an extremely important point. The price benefits now available to all 
U.S. gas consumers and the transportation service to be afforded California industrial 
gas users under the CPUC's October 17 order are not likely to survive disappearance of the 
current gas bubble unless continued competition is assured. 
In the 1960s the U.S. Supreme Court made El Paso divest itself of the Northwest Pipe-
line Company because Northwest offered the possibility of interjecting needed competition 
into the California gas market, but unfortunately, not until now has this potential been 
real. And in that same time period of the '60s, the California utilities and the CPUC 
were successful in preventing Tennessee Gas from supplying California industrial users 
with a dedicated and abundant supply of cheap gas. Same arguments were used as are now 
being used. 
Not until the last few months, after an interstate line was proposed for the EOR 
market, have the CPUC and the California utilities shown any sign of being responsive to 
California industry. If the threat or presence of an interstate line's removed again, 
who's so naive to believe that the CPUC and the California utilities will continue to 
demonstrate concern for the plight of California's industrial gas consumer? Only the 
Kern River project, and not the competing interstates, can adequately meet the needs of 
the EOR market and connect California with new sources of supply under terms that will 
assure this market the benefits of a reliable, reasonably priced gas supply for an 
extended period of time. 
The Mohave and El Dorado projects propose to supply the EOR market from southwestern 
supply sources, which I've mentioned to you, that presently supply California and other 
populated areas of the United States. You can see that from the gas pipeline distribution 
system. When the current gas bubble has burst or sailed by, implementation of Mohave or 
El Dorado would serve only to increase existing pressure for these supplies and it seems 
unlikely that congressmen from the Midwest and the Northeast will sit idly by while 
California satiates it's appetite for Southwest gas if a supply shortage exists. 
Now the arguments made that the Rocky Mountains in Canadian gas can be delivered to 
California by El Paso and Transwestern as cheaply and reliably as it can be delivered by 
Kern River, but that's simply not true. From the map that I've shown you, you can see 
that the gas would have to travel a much greater distance if Kern River is not built. The 
facilities to carry the required volumes of gas from the Rockies to El Paso and Trans-
western's line and over those lines to the California border do not now exist. The line 
of Northwest that comes down from where Kern River breaks off will now carry an excess of 
around 50 to 75 million cubic feet a day, and if we're trying to get an extra 350 or 
500 down there, about $450 million is going to be required to expand it. 
Moreover, it's simply not true that adequate volumes of Rocky Mountain and Canadian 
gas can be exchanged for gas now going from the Southwest to the Midwest to obviate the 
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need the Kern River ec . 
Let me now deal for a moment with the question of the effect on 
residential I know that's one your or issues. The CPUC has largely 
based it order on the assumption that intrastate transportation will benefit ratepayers 
by an interstate line out of California. We don't doubt, as I mentioned, their 
intentions, but we its is flawed and its efforts to thwart Kern 
River is 
First the CPUC's assumption that the utilities and their suppliers can serve the 
EOR market with their is not true and this has been admitted by 
PG&E, Mohave, and the chairman of Pacific ing in formal documents that they have 
either to the FERG statements to their shareholders. 
Second the CPUC has failed to consider the question of who will pay for unneeded 
of their util system. If Kern River is certificated and implemented and 
their capac is not needed, obviously, the exist residential ratepayers are 
go to pay for those unnecessary 
Third, the CPUC has failed to address adequately whether California's traditional 
sources supply are to meet California's long-term needs. 
, and I think , the CPUC has blinders on when it comes 
to the question whether competition in the state gas market will benefit all of the 
cit of this state residential ratepayers. Perhaps the CPUC thinks that 
is good. it doesn't understand that it's really a part of the 
In any event we believe that it's wrong and we hope that this 
committee will avoid its lead. 
In response Kern River's intent to serve other industrial 
, we that If those customers receive adequate service 
from the utilities ter Kern River is built, perhaps the question whether we should later 
seek tha never arise. 
Let me leave you with an additional thought and a request. Our project and other 
be ected to a environmental study before FERC decides 
which ects to In the course of that , which will be conducted by the 
Cal State Lands Commission pursuant to a memorandum agreement with the FERC, one 
the alternatives to be studied will be the ect CPUC proposes to in its 
October 7 order. assumed up until now that the State Lands Commission will do an 
unbiased ob of this and that the CPUC will cooperate to determine the 
environmental effects of all alternatives fac the state in this most fundamental and 
issue of energy 
ine how surprised we were to receive comments, dated November 13, from 
the State Lands Commission to the FERC the October 17 order. to learn that the 
State Lands Commission says that an interstate p is not necessary because existing 
intrastate facilities are to serve the EOR market. And not one single word 
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about the environment or the question of whether the CPUC has done any environmental study. 
We're raising these issues with the CPUC and the 
being made today. 
Long ago, Mr. Chairman, sponsors of Kern River had to endorse, and willingly did so, 
the concepts that monopolies are bad and concern for the environment's good. Apparently, 
some state agencies, at least the CPUC and segments of the Lands Commission, have not come 
this far. They seem to believe that monopoly is good and concern for the environment is 
unnecessary. Our request to you is to help us convince them otherwise. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask the discussants, if you will, tell us how the pipe-
lines will affect your interest and raise some questions that might be on your mind so that 
we can have some cross discussion here. 
SENATOR BARRY KEENE: Senator, is it possible to ask some clarifying questions? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, yes. All right. Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Just some clarifying questions on the testimony that was just pre-
sented. It seems to me you've made out a very powerful case for competition and I would 
hope that it produces some response that joins the issue so that we can more fully under-
stand it. I'm looking at your map here and can't help but noticing that through the 
creative selection of pinpoints, your pipeline is much thicker than all the others that 
are shown there. 
MR. CARTER: We weren't sure the color would make it stand out enough by itself. 
[Laughs.] 
SENATOR KEENE: My question goes, though, my serious question goes to the fact that 
the magenta, I think that's what it's called, colored pipeline designated in the legend, 
the Williams Company pipelines, either connects up at the San Juan River or practically 
connects up with the red pipeline that then moves westward into California. 
MR. CARTER: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE: While the route is not as direct as the one that you propose, it 
appears to be an already constructed, existing or almost existing connection. Why would 
that not be preferable to the one that you're proposing for that reason? 
i'1R. CARTER: Perhaps an argument could be made that it would, Senator Keene, if it 
would carrv anywhere near the needed volume. There's excess capacity in that line. My 
understarrling to the effect it's somewhere in the neighborhood between 50 and 100 million 
a day, and what you're looking at is we propose to carry initially 700 million with easy and 
ready economical expansion up to 1 billion more. Now, you simply can't carry anywhere 
near the volumes we're talking about over that Northwest pipeline route down to the San 
Juan Feel to hook off with the El Paso or Transwestern system without spending at least 
spending $450 million. Our total project is going to be 825, including the California 
lay. By the time that you expand all of the systems necessary to deliver this gas from 
the Rocky Mountain area down through Northwest's system and then through the existing 
systems to the California border, and fromthe California border to the Bakersfield market, 
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it is our belief and we're to deal with that in test before FERC, that the 
cost our is to be substant less and therefore, substantially less of a 
total to whatever consumers benefit from that gas. 
We all know that the shortest distance between two is a line 
and that even when you re gas pipelines. 
SENATOR KEENE: The distance. The other question I had relates to the 
operative features of the PUC order that you say would effect exclude interstate 
p private interstate p ~1at are the operative features of that order, 
and the other part of the it , and have you , and that 
sort 
MR. CARTER: None of the of their order would preclude an inter-
state line. don't have the authority to do that. Federal law will preempt the state 
law and the FERC could license an interstate line regardless of what the PUC says. But 
in their order itself, the PUC said the reason we're this order is to thwart or 
prevent the implementation of an interstate p and it s rather apparent that their 
tact the tactic of SoCal Gas and PUC is to the service to the oil companies, 
lock it in oppose any of the interstate line by drawing out proceedings 
and if necessary, by, I would assume, legal You know much 
better than I that once you've inertia on your side, you are 95 percent of the way 
home. So 'm to make to this committee is don't fall into that trap that 
We' 
SENATOR 
make 
be your 
's thwart an interstate line and service into the area 
systems so that we never have an interstate line." 
any interim benefits that the are going to get 
for any other industrial customers getting those benefits, but 
next step. 
, but I'm to stand in the shoes of the PUC and they're 
that we know what there is and 1 re attempting to deal 
t know what there might be, we know there are a lot of proposals but 
be out there, 
for these purposes, we' 
that kind of 
if we fail to act on what there is to 
our job as the PUC. What would 
d say you're too generous because their words belie that generous 
, "We know what there is and we know what there can be and let's stop 
ine." This is a conscious decision the CPUC to stop the 
line. They don't want any competition or threat of competi-
an 
mentation 
tion in ifornia. 
KEENE: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 
CHAIR~~~ ROSENTHAL: Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I wanted to ask a to to capsulize my understanding, 
are the need for gas for this field is such that the existing 
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supply lines that now exist cannot serve that without some additional expansion, and you 
mentioned $450 million? Is that what you're saying? 
MR. CARTER: No. The $450 million was in response to a slightly different question. 
I am saying, though, that the initial market of 700,000 cubic feet per day, 700 million, 
cannot be met through the existing facility and certainly, the projected 1.1 billion cubic 
feet per day, which everyone estimates is the market, cannot be met and that Mohave has 
recognized that in its application, the ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, okay, I think you've answered my question. So what we're 
saying then is that to get gas for this purpose, there will have to be an expansion or 
construction of a new facility or expansion of existing ones? 
MR. CARTER: Yes, sir. 
SEN~TOR RUSSELL: And what we're talking about is gas specifically and only from your 
pipeline for this project? Is that correct? You're not going to be selling it, using the 
pipeline to branch off and to serve other California consumers? Is that correct? 
MR. CARTER: That's the authority we've sought, Senator. We've made no commitment 
that we're not going to branch off and if five years from now the other industrial con-
sumers are still being subjected to a discriminatory pricing formula for transportation 
or purchase by the CPUC, I would assume they would come to us and to the FERC and say, 
"We need some more authority." 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay, Mr. Chairman, I would think that during the course of this 
hearing that we try to understand what, as I think one of your early questions was to 
determine what costs are going to be addressed by forcing it to go through the existing 
system, and what increased costs to the other consumers will occur by building a new 
system. I assume it addresses just those fixed costs of having a pipeline there, whether 
it's empty or full of gas, there's certain costs of maintaining that and that's part of 
the cost the consumer pays. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, I'd like to ask utilities who have a different concept of 
the problem to respond so we can have some cross discussion here. You've heard him say 
that you can't do it, so somebody else should do it. Yes, sir. 
MR. FRANK MORRIS: Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, my name is Frank Morris. 
I'm the Industrial/Commercial Markets Services Manager of Southern California Gas Company. 
With your indulgence I'd like to touch on four points very quickly. First, I'd like to 
describe the size of the market we're dealing with. Secondly, the capacity of the 
existing utilities to serve that market. Just briefly, the EOR customers' concern with 
respect to taking service from the existing utilities, and then a need for a transporta-
tion tariff in the State of California. 
The size of the market you may have heard described at being the largest on the North 
1\nu.:rlc<lll ContJnelll. lL 's est imuteJ to be ubl)ul 1 billion cublc l evL ol g:tH per day. AL 
today's rates that would convert to about $1 billion a year in annual revenue. The 
-14-
utilities in California, Southern California Gas Company and Pacific Gas and 
Electric, current have in place facilities capable of serving the entire estimated poten-
tial load of the EOR requirements in the San Joaquin Valley. Southern California Gas 
alone has the capability of 450,000,000 cubic feet of gas per , and 
we have under contract right now 250,000,000 cubic feet of gas to be served to the EOR 
customers in San Joaquin Valley, an additional 85,000,000 for EOR related cogeneration 
loads. 
We have for many years served the San Joaquin Valley, the Southern San Joaquin 
We have an extensive distribution system and transmission system capable of 
that gas up there. In addition to that, PG&E has two major transmission lines 
directly through the area, so the existing facilities are in place without any major 
capital investment to serve the entire projected load. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: On that point, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The ultimate 1 billion, whatever it was, you can serve that? You 
can serve the initial 700,000,000 need? 
MR. MORRIS: Let me give you a breakdown ..• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Just say yes or no. 
MR. MORRIS Yes, we can. 
SENATOR RUSSELL You can. 
MR. MORRIS: We can serve the entire projected ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's in direct contradiction to what this gentlemen has said, 
is that correct? Do I understand it? 
MR. MORRIS: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MR. MORRIS: The load of 1.2 billion cubic feet that was referred to by Mr. Carter 
includes some load that is going to be served by gas that is produced in the area and is 
not, therefore, gas that would be subject to either service by the utilities or an out of 
state pipeline. There is gas produced in the area that would be used in enhanced oil 
recovery and there is a certain amount of equipment that will always burn oil because of 
its location, because of backup needs, and so forth. So the actual load that has to be 
served by a p or the utility company is closer to 900,000,000 cubic feet of gas a 
SNEATOR RUSSELL: Ultimately or initially? 
MR. MORRIS: These estimates are based m the projected expansion as of 1990. Now 
in association with the EOR load, which is the production of oil, there is cogeneration 
potential. The cogeneration potential is, of course, much more efficient to operate. As 
a result, it displaces the need for some of the heat that would be required in the EOR 
operation. The actual EOR requirements, based on DOG production figures in the fields and 
the ion figures of the various suppliers or operators in the fields of up there, is 
about 650,000,000 cubic feet a day of pur EOR requirement, an additional 250,000,000 cubic 
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feet per day is EOR cogeneration related load, for a total of about 900,000,000 cubic feet 
a day. That is what the market is. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So that the figures of the 1.2 that was mentioned did not take 
into consideration the cogeneration? Did not take into consideration the amount of gas 
that's there already in that community, but the total amount needed by the companies there 
for their EOR? Is that what you said? 
MR. MORRIS: The total amount of gas required for EOR operations and cogeneration 
amounts to about 1.2 billion; 300,000,000 of that will be supplied either in the area by 
oil or by locally produced gas, and the market that would be supplied by the utility 
companies or an outside pipeline is about 900,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Now that would indicate to me that since you have facilities 
which are able to deliver more gas than we are now delivering, what's the cost for main-
taining such an excess capacity tothe ratepayers right now? 
MR. MORRIS: That is one of the areas that I wanted to touch on. There has been some 
discussion about whether it would be to the advantage of existing ratepayers for us, for 
the California utilities to serve that load and I think that the fact that we have capacity, 
both PG&E and ourselves, that is not being utilized is an answer to that question. Any 
of that capacity that is utilized as a result of serving this market is going to benefit 
all of the ratepayers in California. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: May I ask a question on that point? You have an unutilized capacity 
of 900,000,000? 
MR. MORRIS: We, Southern California Gas Company, has an unutilized capacity right 
now of 450,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day that we could use, we could serve in the 
San Joaquin Valley. 
SENATOR KEENE: 
to meet the needs? 
PG&E has something in excess of that, about the same equivalent load. 
So you're saying that together your unutilized capacity will be able 
MR. MORRIS: Together, the unutilized capacity will exceed the market requirements 
projected for EOR in the San Joaquin Valley. 
SENATOR KEENE: And if at that point there is growth in California, an increase in 
demand for natural gas and all of the unutilized capacity has been used, what happens? 
MR. MORRIS: An existing gas distribution system and transmission system is a living 
thing. It grows and is added to as loads need to be served, as communities are built and 
pipelines need to be extended in to serve those communities, those pipelines are extended 
in. 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm talking about the main branches of the pipeline. I take it that 
that's where the capacity has its limitations. 
MR. MORRIS: WeJl, it has its limitations to the degree that we have more capacity 
available between the two systems than is going to be needed to serve the EOR requirements 
in the San Joaquin Valley. Now you must recognize that all of the expansion on the PG&E 
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system or on the SoCal is not going to be in the San Joaquin Valley. Our 
distribution system runs all the way from the Mexican border to the San Joaquin Valley. 
s very system. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, if after you've met the Kern needs just 
the force of ion there is an increased need for natural gas, it seems to me 
that you have to build another or PG&E would have to build another pipeline, or 
Kern River would have to build another pipeline, or somebody would to serve existing needs 
because you will have utilized all of the available pipeline space. 
MR. MORRIS: There is more capacity in other parts of the system. I am talking about 
the capacity specifically to serve the San Joaquin Valley. There is more capacity to 
serve County, or in the case of PG&E, I would assume to serve the San Francisco 
We're talking about capacity that is available right now, without any major capital 
investment, to serve the San Joaquin That's to get gas from the California border 
the San Joaquin Valley. 
SENATOR KEENE: How long have you had this excess capacity? 
MR. MORRIS: This capacity has been there for some period of time. It's not always 
excess. It's a matter of where development is taking place, where loads are developing, 
way you shift the gas from one part of your system to another part of your system. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, my question still is how long have you had the unused capacity? 
MR. MORRIS: This capacity was designed into the system when it was built. 
SENATOR KEENE: For what purpose? With Kern County in mind or something else in 
. MORRIS think the--and I was not involved in the initial design of SoCal's or 
's system, but that gas is brought in from out of the state a long way away to serve 
the entire State of California and it was done some 40 years ago. 
SENATOR KEENE: Why wouldn't utility consumers say that that's an example of exces-
ive investment and of pipeline capacity? 
MR. MORRIS: I don't think it was a case of overbuilding. It was a case of expecting 
for expansion in the California market which has taken place. It 
has been a regular 
SENATOR KEENE: 
market and the largest natural gas market in the country. 
, but now the argument is that if interstate pipelines were to 
in, private interstate p were to come in, that would be a poor investment in 
the future unlike the investment that was made 40 years ago by Southern Cal Gas Company 
for sufficient excess to accommodate 
MR. MORRIS: I'm not to say that that is a poor investment. What I am saying 
is that we have a system in and paid for that is capable of serving the re-
that are up there. Whether it's to in another pipeline for some 
future load that may materialize or not is a question for someone else. 
SENATOR KEENE: But isn't that your argument in favor of the PUC order that it is an 
ustifiable additional investment when you have the capacity and ultimately the con-
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sumer will have to pay for that investment? That's not your argument? 
MR. MORRIS: I think you have to look at two things, Senator. One is you've got 
certain underutilized capacity in the system. Is it more cost effective to the customers 
onyour system to use that capacity? Assuming all that capacity is fully utilized, I think 
the next question you have to raise is, is it more cost effective to build incrementally on 
your existing utility system, or is it more cost effective to allow another system to be 
built? The point Mr. Carter kept making which I feel needs some response, the concept 
kept being talked about was a private interstate pipeline. There's no such thing as a 
private interstate pipeline when you go to the FERC. FERC has to determine whether it's 
in the public convenience and necessity, or the public interest to build a brand new inter-
state pipeline. What you also have to realize is there are two interstate pipelines 
presently serving Southern California: El Paso; and Transwestern. So what the PUC and 
the utilities are doing is saying to the FERC, "In reaching your decision as to what's in 
the public interest, you have to recognize that there are existing distribution facili-
ties within the State of California that can serve this market." That's, you know, and 
when people talk about competition versus monopoly, I think the point Chairman Rosenthal 
made at the beginning, everybody talked about telephone competition as the be all and the 
end all. I think we have some question marks today as to whether that unfettered compe-
tition is in the overall public interest, especially of the high priority customers. 
SENATOR KEENE: I assume somebody's question just got answered, but it really wasn't 
mine. [Laughter.] I guess my question still is, 40 years ago--we're dealing a little 
loosely with the factual situation, I understand, but sometime ago you built in some 
unused capacity on the theory there would be additional growth. Maybe that was prudent, 
maybe it wasn't. It may turn out to be prudent if that unused capacity is utilized here 
for the transmission to Kern County. On the other hand, on the other hand, you're now 
arguing, it appears to me, that there should not be additional capacity here, an addition-
al pipeline should not be built because that would burden the consumers ultimately and 
it's not an appropriate investment. If that's not it, I wish you would tell me what is 
it because I'm trying to understand your argument. I really am and I haven't ... 
MR. GENE SATRAP: Senator, may I try? 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes. 
MR. SATRAP: My name is Gene Satrup with Pacific Gas and Electric Company. Just for 
a quick background I am its manager for gas supply management. That responsibility is to 
purchase gas in California, the Rocky Mountains and mid-continent, as well as to deal 
with these producers to sell gas into the enhanced oil recovery market here in Kern County, 
as well as in Fresno County and Monterey County where we deal in the San Ardo Oil Field, 
and the Coalinga Oil Field. 
I'd like to try to answer your question, Senator, by saying that the PG&E system, 
and I'm restricting my comment to the PG&E system, was built to serve the San Francisco 
Bay region. About three-fifths of PG&E's market is in the San Francisco area. There was 
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not spare capacity put on those p that I'm assuming are on your map that depict 
our mains, 300a and 300b. What happened was the cost of gas became so prohibitive and it 
as a resource became scare that industrial customers left the PG&E system for alternate 
fuel, And that developed the capacity that is available today. 
Planned conservation assisted us gaining additional capacity on that main system. 
We don't believe that traditional marketing we will recover the sales to fill 
lnes as we in the '40s, and '50s, and early '60s, so that the PG&E system, 
and 'm assuming the same for Southern California Gas Company through its management, did 
not overbuild projecting or anticipating loads. They lost loads and now we're attempting 
to get back full capacity. The purpose being to spread the fixed costs of these systems 
over greater units sold, therefore, reducing costs to all of our ratepayers. 
SENATOR KEENE: I understand that part of the position. Is the other part of it then, 
is the corollary to that that you do oppose, therefore, investment and other so-called 
out-of-state pipelines, which are incorrectly called "private out-of-state" pipe-
lines, according to the witness. But whatever they're called, whatever you choose to call 
you do oppose them and the additional capacity they would create because it would 
undercut this position that you've just taken? 
MR. SATRAP: Yes, sir. Our opposition to the interstate pipelines revolves on the 
fact that the capacity available between PG&E and SoCal systems collectively, can be used 
to serve this market through transportation. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, I understand that then and that answers that question. What 
about the question of your to go around two sides of a triangle and the additional 
associated with that as compared with Kern County and this map that I have in front 
of River, rather, and this map that I have in front of me? Not you, not PG&E, 
rather Southern California Gas. 
MR. JOHN: I'm somewhat at a disadvantage, Senator, since I don't have the map. 
him map.] I think that goes back to the question of access to the Rocky 
Mountain gas and I think the assumption that Kern River's made is that their route is the 
direct and cheapest way of getting that gas into California. I think that's some-
that PG&E might want to comment on more than us since that line also ties back into 
Canada and I think PG&E can indicate that it has the ability to get Canadian or Rocky 
Mountain gas through its own util system . 
• SATRAP: Thank you, Fred. I'd like to start by commenting on Mr. Carter's 
comment about the unavailabil of Rocky Mountain gas .•. 
SENATOR KEENE: Wait. Would you start by responding to my question? I know you 
have a 
stand your 
and I don't want to defer your presentation except that I'll under-
better once understand your position. 
MR. SATRAP: Not understanding the engineering of the proposed Kern River pipeline, 
I can say that that route was selected for the business purposes of that company. 
We don't understand that particular route as being anymore efficient method by which 
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Rocky Mountain Gas or Canadian Gas can flow to California. I don't know the reason for 
the selection of the route. 
SENATOR KEENE: The distances look shorter than the distances over which the gas would 
have to travel to get to Kern County through the other pipelines. 
MR. SATRAP: Shorter, yes, sir, but if I understand from that ... 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm interested in the costs associated with that. As a lay person 
I'm interested in the costs associated with that. 
MR. SATRAP: If I understand the map, some of those other lines appear to be existing 
pipelines. Pipelines in place that could be expanded on an incremental basis so that I 
think you'd have to compare what the cost is to expand an existing line with a brand new 
line and I'm ... 
SENATOR KEENE: I understand that and I'm not focusing, therefore, on that portion of 
it. I'm focusing rather on the cost of moving the gas from the fields where the gas 
exist; the hatched areas over to Bakersfield. 
MR. SATRAP: If I may try, yes, moving gas in its most direct route is least expen-
sive for the fuel that's required to move it, or the loss of inventory that you have in the 
moving of that gas. The reason this route was selected, I don't know if that was one of 
the governing criterias in it or not. I'm familiar with what the planning criteria was. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. My final question is a general one and you may choose to 
respond in the course of your overall presentation or in recapitulating at some point, 
but as Ear as the consumer is concerned it seems to me there is an underlying issue of 
whether the benefits of monopoly outweight the detriments of the loss of competition. In 
this situation, in this particular situation and I understand the reasons for monopoly 
in the utility industry generally--would you at some point address that issue of whether 
the purchaser benefits by competition or loses through the loss of advantages of monopoly 
if you allow these other pipelines to come in. It's an underlying question for me in the 
scale as to which way it tips so I would hope that you could address that in some defini-
tive way. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRNAN ROSENTHAL: Any other comment? Mr. Gandara. 
MR. ARTURO GANDARA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and committee. I appreciate 
the invitation on behalf of the Energy Commission. At the same time I'd like to clarify 
that my comments are my own since we don't have any prepared testimony and, therefore, 
the Commission has not necessarily reviewed it and/or approved it, And also let me say 
that I was assigned this seat--I do not sit here because I'm opposed to interstate pipe-
lines or because I support the utility proposals or the gas distribution situation, nor 
do I disfavor them. 
What I would like to do in terms of my conunents since it was conmnHlicatl'd to Till' in 
my invitation was to assist the committee in its consideration and deliberation of this 
issue is to perhaps back up a little bit and ask what I consider to be some fundamental 
questions that any public policymaker has to deal with and the first one is to ask 
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whether one has come to a conclusion that we want more oil produced? We have started 
off with the assumption that we're going to burn gas to produce more oil and I think 
there's a real fundamental question, do we need more oil produced at this time, both in 
terms of the national interest and/or in terms of the benefits to California? 
I refer to oil because oil and gas are inexplicably linked. Their pricing is linked 
and that there is an assymetry that curiously develop when we look at oil and gas. Oil 
we tend to look in terms of national interest, and gas we tend to look in terms of the 
state. So the first question is do we want more oil produced? The price of oil is the 
lowest it's been in many years. Our projections indicate that oil prices at the crude 
level will continue to decrease. That it will take at least ten years for oil prices to 
even come back to the point where it is right now. 
We have a situation at the national level where the President has authorized the 
export of oil, of coconut oil from Alaska to Japan. We have a situation where the filling 
of the petroleum reserve has been limited to about 500,000,000 barrels instead of the 
expected 750,000,000 barrels. So in the large strategic picture, do we want more oil 
produced? If we look at the reasons sometimes given for the producing of more oil, it is 
that we wish to displace foreign imports. If we look at the history of where the 
of foreign imports has come from, we find that 70 percent of foreign imports 
have been displaced by conservation, 20 percent ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How many percent? 
MR. GANDARA: Seventy percent. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Seven-zero? 
MR. GANDARA: Yes. Twenty percent has been displaced for alternative fuels. Ten 
percent has been by increased domestic production. That's on a national scale. 
Of that 10 percent increased domestic production, if we were to increase to burn all the 
gas we could and increase all the production we could from the Kern County oil field, 
would we a significant amount of gas that would figure--a significant amount of 
oil that would displace in terms of meeting those national goals or not? 
not 
In any case, that begs the fundamental question. Is a displacement of oil at this 
in time in our nation's history in the best interests of the country? Should we 
reconsider whether this may be the best of all times to purchase oil? There 
are some who argue that that in fact may be the case. With an excess of production 
capacity to actual production in the Middle East close to 10,000,000 barrels per day, 
with OPEC in disarray there is considerable thought that in fact the increased production 
would not increase purchases of imports might in fact produce any upward pressure on 
prices. 
The second big question that I would ask is if, nonetheless, we come to the conclu-
sion that we do want more oil produced domestically and that if we do want that oil to 
be produced from the Kern County oil fields in particular in California, the question is 
do we want more gas consumed to produce that oil, because that's what we're embarking on. 
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We're embarking on a gas consumption policy unless we talk just about EOR in Kern County. 
There's also, as was brought out in some of the questioning that there will be increasing 
demand from cogeneration itself that's non-EOR because of the state policies 
that have promoted it in the past, as well as PURPA (Public Utilities Regulating Policy 
Act o 1978), and also there s residential and commercial consumption of gas that will be 
increasing. So the question will be: will there be enough gas in the future? What is the 
projected demand and supp and demand/supply in balance? So there's that fundamental 
question, do we want to burn gas to produce oil to be able then to produce gasoline and go 
that circuitous route? 
One of the--of course, there may be many reasons why you want more oil produced and 
why you may want gas to result or to feed that production. One of the ones that was given 
that 1 would at least like to balance the comment out is that the benefit that has been 
given that I heard was that it is environmentally beneficial. There is no doubt that per 
btu that if you burn gas rather than oil, you wind up with less emissions. But if we 
really look at what's happening in the Kern County area and you look at the air pollution 
permits, we're looking essent at air pollution levels. And so what we're talking is 
about increasing efficiency, that is there won't necessarily be an environmental benefit 
as a result of less emissions because the production will increase to the level that will 
in fact wind up having no particular offset. I may be wrong, but I know of no proposals 
that says, "If you let us burn gas, we will reduce our overall levels by 25 percent," or 
anything like that. The whole idea is that you do gain efficiency because you can produce 
more oil per pound of pollution, but the pounds of pollution will likely remain the same. 
While if you do decide that you do want to burn gas to produce oil, then what are the 
options and the pros and the cons? For that you really are doing the right thing, what 
you're doing today. What are stakes and who wins and who loses? Can you realistically 
restructure markets without redistributing benefits and burdens? The answer to that 
obviously, is no, but the assumption should not be made that the current structure is the 
fairest. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could you say that again? I didn't--could you repeat that? 
MR. GANDARA: Yes, what I was saying is that I don't believe you can restructure 
markets without redistributing benefits and burdens, but the assemption should not also be 
made that, therefore, you do not disturb this current situation because I would assume 
that the current situation would be the fairest. 
The issue that I see thatyou have focused on is control versus gas price competi-
tion, and that is who controls and can it be maintained? It has already been mentioned 
that interstate lines have Federal preemption, therefore, we realistically ask what 
actually can be done by the state and/or by a state legislature to limit, if it were to 
desire to do so, an interstate pipeline? Well, the protections and involvements can be 
long and lengthy and perhaps something could be done, but the fact of the matter is that 
the Federal preemption, it would be a way by which certainly control would be limited, 
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and that's what we see in the here. 
On the other hand, there is gas price competition that is being experienced in other 
parts of the country and would there be benefits whereby it would be a better risk for 
California to introduce some gas competition or some more, not that it's absent. 
And, in fact deal with a little bit loss of control. I'd like to state here that I don't 
think the issue really is whether it's an issue of the PUC proposal versus the interstate 
P it' both. If you are talking about bringing competition to bear 
on the market, it does seem that the multiplication of and sellers would 
benefit the gas in competition. Here in California, as you know, we have some of 
the rates in the country. We have that because we have some of the 
costs of fuel input, that is both gas and oil, and the situation could very well 
be that the increased gas price competition would have beneficial effects in being able 
to restructure all those markets. And that's to say that the PUC proposal would be a step 
in the direction. Whether everybody is with it or not is another issue. That 
also doesn't mean that that should preclude any other competition from entering the 
In fact, I would be more concerned about so many prospects for the limitations 
ion of the sellers and that is to say of the than I would be about the 
that , in fact, the purchase of gas the pipelines is going to be limited to 
EOR purposes, then does the ratepayer care what interstate pipeline it is? I'm not quite 
certain that should be the case. That would, in fact, be discriminatory application 
benefits to California, if there is benefit from gas price competition. So that's 
bit of that you should look at. 
From the other of we have had of course, an insulated gas distribution 
situation many years and you can ask the question whether that has benefitted the 
state from the 
I 
additional 
is 
demand were 
of view of gas competition. 
like to kind of end my initial comments by also leaving you with an 
that when you look at it from the point of view of gas price competi-
the EOR market at all? I mean, if you were to assume that 
be constant and supply were to be constant, would there still be a benefit 
to an interstate p ine or not? Would there still be a benefit toward having a multi-
ion of and sellers, having more buyers to pressure in the marketplace? 
So the arguments could be of course, many on both sides and I think you've heard all of 
them. I t think that you will have an easy time of resolving these issues in your 
mind, but I d like to raise at least those considerations to you because I think are 
very fundamental and at least several of them back up two steps, I think, from 
where we started. So with that, I would be pleased to try an answer any of the questions 
that you all may have. 
CHAIR!'1AN ROSENTHAL: Any further comment? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I have a question of Mr. John. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: We've been talking about fixed costs and can you tell me when a 
consumer buys "x" amount of gas, what percentage of that is attributed to fixed costs 
and what is attributed to the cost of the gas? 
MR. JOHN: Okay. At the present time, out of every--and I'm only talking about 
Southern California Gas Company now--out of every dollar of revenue, approximately 75 per-
cent goes to the cost of gas and approximately 25 percent is fixed costs; and when I'm 
talking about fixed costs that includes labor, nonlabor costs, taxes to the government, 
and your return on investment. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Then are you saying that that would, then if you have a less supply 
of gas going through, the portion of those costs, fixed costs would increase? Or the 
portion would be the same but I guess the dollar value would increase? 
MR. JOHN: I think the real impact is how do you allocate those fixed costs that are 
not being picked up by certain customers and I think that's the real key here. If you've 
got more customers on your system you can spread those costs over a larger base, thereby 
putting a lesser burden on those customers remaining on the system. If you don't have 
those increased customers, or if you lose customers--for example, right now Southern 
California Gas Company is serving a fair amount of load to EOR and cogeneration. If we 
lost those customers, those fixed costs that they're presently picking up would have to be 
spread elsewhere and that was the point that Gene Satrap was making earlier. What created 
problems in the late '70s and early '80s was as the price of gas increased and oil prices 
decreased, customers left the system and those fixed costs had to be spread. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, your fixed costs as it relates to manpower and workers, and 
so forth, you have less gas to supply, you need probably less workers. If you have more, 
you mean to say you have the same number of, same fixed costs when the pipeline was first 
built and you had this tremendous excess capacity? 
MR. JOHN: You see what's happening right now, Senator, is we're still adding a sub-
stantial number of customers a year. Right now we have little over 4 million customers. 
You still have to go out and serve those customers, especially the residential; and of 
our 4 million customers, 3.8 million of them are residential, so you still have to---I'll 
give you one example. Within the last two weeks we've had some early cold weather in 
Southern California and so we had a lot of calls from our residential customers to come 
out and turn on their pilot lights. That's going to occur whether you have more or less 
gas going through your system, and it takes people and money to do that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The 75/25, was that the same ratio when the system was first 
built that had this tremendous excess capacity? 
MR. JOHN: It's varied and I want to go back to that point. It was not tremendous 
excess capacity. When you build a pipeline, you build some excess into it so that you're 
not having later on to go in and expand that on a non-cost effective basis. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I understand that. 
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MR. JOfu~: But the reason for the excess is more recent, as Mr. Satrap point out, 
because of conservation and because of fuel switching because of oil prices. But 10 years 
ago, for example, it was about a ratio between your cost of gas and your fixed 
costs. Three years ago it was about 85 percent cost of gas and 15 percent fixed costs, so 
the price of gas has gone down but not nearly to the point it was 10 years ago. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Forty years ago when the system was first built, would you care to 
hazard a guess as to what the ratio was? 
MR. JOHN: I was just a thought in my parents mind at that time. I don't want to 
hazard a guess. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Somebody in the company would know, I suppose. Okay, thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Along the same lines, are fixed costs a function of volume or 
in any way? 
MR. JOHN: As I said earlier, you still have the fixed cost of operating your system 
no matter how much gas is going through it because the pipeline is still there, it's got 
to be and maintained, the customers still have to be served. Where the problem 
arises is if you have less customers on your system taking gas, it's how you spread those 
costs among those customers and that's the whole issue today in the world of rate design, 
is how do you allocate the remaining fixed costs of operating your system among your 
residential versus commercial versus industrial versus wholesale customers. 
SENATOR KEENE: Without regard to that allocation, but with regard to the amount, 
, or of gas that moves through a pipeline at a given time, there is virtu-
no effect on fixed costs? 
JOHN I think if you get to a point where there is no gas running through a 
certain for an extended 
abandon system, that p 
people to operate that portion. 
of time, you have to make a decision as to whether 
system. If you do, obviously, you need less 
SENATOR KEENE: What if it's reduced by half? 
JOHN: A lot on how you will see that reduction. It doesn't make 
sense to abandon a of 
which is what we've faced in he last 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you. 
system if the loss of market is only temporary 
years. It's been a temporary a loss of market. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I ask another It seemsto me that with the growth of 
California as you project in the future, at some point these p ines that come through 
Arizona and to some extent the one that comes down through Oregon, are going to 
reach a maximum capacity to serve the people of California. At that you're going 
to have to expand, build another pipeline, or whatever, which is going to cost the rate-
payers. It seems to me that if we do this, we're bringing in another supply of gas which 
other than this fixed cost, is outside the normal ratepaying consumer and would 
us additional years before which we would have to build this additional supply and 
-25-
therefore, raise the rates to our consumers. So you have on one side, you're postponing 
that cost to the future further away, you may be increasing, as we're talking about now, 
some fixed costs to consumers today, but there's some, maybe some payoff or tradeoff, 
which I don't understand, but it seems to me it just provides a source of gas which 
doesn't impinge upon the other ratepayers except in this area of fixed costs, but it will 
delay the need to build another system. Can you comment on that? 
MR. SATRAP: I'll attempt to do that, Senator. PG&E and Southern California Gas 
Company recently submitted to the Public Utilities Commission various work papers on that 
specific issue. PG&E's document, The Analysis of Facility Requirements and Cost of Service 
to Serve the Enhanced Oil Recovery and Enhanced Oil Recovery Cogeneration Market, completed 
by PG&E in it's engineering department, look at various scenarios of service: Cold winter; 
normal winter; summer; and other presumptions. And contrary to Mr. Carter's comment, PG&E 
can serve the entire enhanced oil recovery market with no facility expansion through the 
year 2000 under certain conditions. Taking a more conservative approach and attempting to 
determine what market could be served under conditions that were prescribed that only 
occur once in every 35 years--cold winter--PG&E in it's portion of its market share in 
the enhanced oil recovery could serve through 1996 without any facility expansion, so 
that if we look at the supplies, and I think everyone agrees that the supplies are avail-
able to serve this market, if you look at the facilities that are required, and I don't 
think that this is dissimilar to SoCalGas either in that we have shared our facility 
capabilities under.the Commission's order, we both, as previously mentioned, can serve that 
market through the year 2000. 
We are able to move around 900,000,000 cubic feet a day. The market expectations 
that we hear that exceed 1 billion a day take various market consideration into account 
and I think you have to discount some of those larger loads based on host fired crude 
or California fired gas. But the market to be served to bring gas from outside of 
California, both Pacific Gas and Electric Company and SoCalGas, are able through existing 
facilities to serve through the year 2000. Now if we take the scenarios of cold winter 
and the need for some expansion of our facilities, I think from an economic consideration 
it is easier and less costly to incrementally or add on to a system than it is to build a 
whole system and go from zero deliverability to 600 deliverability overnight. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But the size of the pipeline at Arizona in only so big. That's 
where you get your gas, right? 
MR. SATRAP: We receive our gas in the state fromthetwo pipelines in the Topoc area 
at the Arizona border and Canada and both systems have great capability of storing gas, 
so that although you may see either any of the pipelines having capacity constraint during 
the winter, it's the summer months when the utilities bring gas to California and hold 
that gas for peak deliverability during the winter. Last week when we were hit with a 
cold winter snap we were drawing more than 1 billion cubic feet a day out of the ground 
that we brought in during the summer, so that is not a constraint. 
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MR. JOHN: What he's saying is you've got to combine your storage operations with 
your pipeline capability. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But at the year 2000 you're going to have to expand that system. 
You're going to have to build a bigger pipeline to bring the gas in so you can do all 
these wonderful things that you're doing with it. All I'm saying is that if you defer 
that, that's a cost that the ratepayers don't have to bear because this pipeline, or one 
of the two pipelines, is going to be providing those customers with gas outside the system 
and so you have a greater flexibility for existing systems to serve into the year 2000 and 
beyond. 
MR. SATRAP: Senator, if we separate the interstate pipelines, they are able to serve 
that gas we perceive beyond the year 2000. If you look within California, we are able to 
serve with nominal costs after the year 1996 all the load thatis projected, but more 
importantly, if the interstate pipelines did come in to serve that load between now and 
1995 before any facility expansion is needed, the California ratepayers would not benefit 
from the serving of that market because the two utilities would not have the contribution 
margin or the money collected to cover the fixed costs, so it's inverse. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That I understand. That's a short-run, immediate problem. I was 
to get at the long-term cost of new facilities being paid for by the ratepayers and 
deferring that and somewhere along there's one way to relate that and maybe the PUC knows 
how to do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I have two or three things that are bothering me about what I've 
heard so far. On one hand policy has to be made as to whether or not we need more oil, 
according to the Energy Commission. Kern River says right now we have no intention of 
serving any other customers other than the EOR, but there's no guarantee that they won't 
take somebody else off the line. Southern Cal and PG&E have a concern that ratepayers 
may be affected by the gas that they're now selling to the San Joaquin Valley in terms of 
bottom line dollars, and the possibility that in the future even more large customers may 
come off the line. 
And then I, quite frankly, look at the history of PG&E and Southern Cal Gas--not 
really cooperating well--to serve the EOR in the San Joaquin Valley, and now you're con-
cerned because the EOR decided they'll bring in their own. And so I have these mixed 
questions in my mind and I don't really know, I don't know how to answer them for myself. 
You haven't been cooperative, now you will be cooperative because they've figured out 
another way of doing it. 
The question is do we in fact need more oil and then further, what's going to prevent 
that line from taking off many more of your customers, the large users, and how does that 
affect the ratepayers? So anybody want to touch that? 
MR. JOHN: I'd like to make one point, Senator. You said the EORs have a preference 
for an interstate pipeline. I don't think that's been proven yet. We have various pro-
posals by some pipeline companies for an interstate pipeline. I don't think the EOR pro-
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ducers have said yet formally which way they want to go. We do know for a fact, however, 
that Texaco has signed an agreement with Southern California Gas Company for transportion 
to the EOR market. We know that Shell has signed an agreement with Southern California 
Gas Company for transportation and exchange of gas within California. To my knowledge, 
those are the only contracts of that nature that have been signed. I think what those 
produc2rs, however, are waiting for are some additional signals from the Commission, and 
l'm sure Commissioner Vial will expand on this, some additional signals from the Com-
mission that the transportation proposal that it proposed on October 17 will come to 
fruition. 
As far as cooperation between PG&E and SoCal, there have been differences of opinion 
but I think it relates to the same reasons as we talked about earlier. We're both trying 
to protect our ratepayers' interests to the best, as best as possible. Ultimately, the 
PUC may have to make the decision as to how to do that, but I think that's also in the 
Commission's crystal ball, let us say, that they want their transportation decision and a 
resolution of the interutility dispute to take place at the same time and I think that 
will happen. I think then, and only then will we really know where the EOR producers are 
coming from. 
Sure, they've expressed concerns about the proposed order. Any good businessman will 
because he wants the best deal he can get, but let's see what the game in town is or 
whether they're going to play the game or not. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Mr. Gerlach, you didn't have an opportunity to say any-
thing, Do you have anything to add that hasn't already been said by those sitting at the 
table? [Laughter.) 
MR. WALTER GERLACH: Senator, I'm not clairvoyant. [Laughs.} I really don't know 
what's been said. I do have a few comments if I could make them. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. We've had an explanation of what EOR is, and we've 
had an explanation of the Kern River and Mohave as to what they are planning, what they 
would like to do. You've heard since,you've been sitting here comments from the dis-
cussants. I'll give you a couple of minutes. 
MR. GERLACH: All right. I have some prepared comments here that I will submit to 
the committee. What I would like to do, stepping away from these if I could, is just 
give you some comments that come from the very basis of our corporation. You have to under-
stand that this whole thing was started in 1984 by our company and one of the oil com-
panies, so the rest of the people have come in since that point. 
What I'd like to do is go back to that January 1984, where Producer's Gas Company, 
the company that I'm out of as part of ElDorado, met with a very, very willing market. 
One that in fact appeared to be crying out for help. The market was industrial and it 
consumed heavy oil for fuel due to the fact that natural gas was priced at $4.80-plus 
per million btu, and crude oil was priced in the high-to-mid-$3 per million btu range 
and no help was in sight. 
-28-
California was not like the other 48 contiguous states in that it did not have an 
interstate option to transport gas to industrial customers. Undaunted, we approached both 
the or California gas transmission and distribution utilities with a proposal to pro-
vide the required service, to determine if in fact they would excess 
gas that we had already available in Oklahoma to these industrial customers to replace the 
oil currently consumed. We were told in no uncertain terms where to go and to take 
horse we rode in on with us. Thus, the statement that has been heard around the gas 
for years was restated, "You can't get gas into California." 
The key word here is "can't." Senator, in our vocabulary that's a stimulant and not 
a PGC, my company, set about finding a way to satisfy this unserved natural 
gas market need under the criteria set by the EOR market itself and they are: 
gas supply; long-term, what I'm calling long-term would be a 1 
competitively priced with crude oil. The utility service available to the 
EOR market did not satisfy any of these criteria and as a consequence the EOR market con-
tinues for the most part to burn crude oil. 
As as the 1984 California Gas Report, a report compiled by the utilities, 
not by us, both of the major gas utilities indicated that they were not or could not serve 
the EOR market as outlined in the criteria previously mentioned. They reflected major 
curtailments in the EOR or higher priority users in the early 1990s. Both of these gas 
utilities are structured to serve the high priority residential, commercial, and small 
industrial markets. The larger volume loads are extra and must be heavily curtailed over 
ime due to the competitive objectives of the firms' service. The EOR market falls in 
this volume industrial category or possibly beyond because of its uniqueness. We 
do believe that the distribution utilities can offer the level of service required 
by the EOR market and not jeopardize their current priority customers. 
PGC determined that the way to solve this situation was via an interstate pipeline 
fuel to transport EOR market-owned gas, which in turn does not have any 
objectives. 1-vrt.en our project, quote, "leaked out," the response was, "You 
cant do that." Our favorite word, "can't." The response then went to, "Over our dead 
," followed by a panic which stated, "The interstates are coming, the interstates are 
" 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Who's saying all this? 
MR. GERLACH: This is what we're picking up in the trade. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: From whom? 
. GERLACH: Various and sundry people, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The PUC? The utilities? 
~ffi. GERLACH: Not the PUC. We're picking this up from various people. I'm not 
ient of all of these but I have heard these from people in the trade. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me just shorten this up a little bit. What's unique about 
your pipeline? 
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MR. GERLACH: What's unique? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, you know? We have other suggestions for pipelines. Tell us 
about your line. 
MR. GERLACH: Our line is a 42 inch pipeline that extends from the EOR market back to 
Topoc, Arizona which is very similar to one of the other proposals. Our's was designed 
and in the can before their's was even talked about, but that's another story. Outside of 
that it's the level of service that we're able to provide that we feel doesn't make us 
unique, there are other pipelines that could possibly do the same thing. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's the capacity? 
MR. GERLACH: 520,000,000 a day free flow up to a maximum of 1.2 billion with com-
pression. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right, can you kind of sum up? 
MR. GERLACH: Well, what I'm trying to get to, Senator, is at any time of the pro-
posals that we have presented represented a threat and that, that I got with a guaranteed 
type conversation that has been presented before we would like to get into. We are not a 
threat to the existing utilities. We are not a threat to the CPUC, and we're not a 
threat to the State of California. We feel quite truly that the presentation that we have 
rt~ade, the format, and the pipeline that we're talking about would be beneficial in many, 
many ways to the State of California and specifically, to the market that desires this 
service. I think these people have to be heard from because it's these people that are 
in essence that small body of ratepayers that will be paying the bill for this service. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. I'd like to ask you gentlemen now to 
leave and l want to call up ... [Laughs.] ... the next panelist, Gary Simon, the California 
Representative of the El Paso Natural Gas Company, and Mr. Vial, why don't we have you 
up here. We've already announced that your plane was late. I'm sure you were as upset 
about that that we were. 
MR. DONALD VIAL: I had a little deregulation experience. [Laughter.] 
MR. GARY SIMON: Mr. Chairman and members, my name is Gary Simon. l'm the California 
Representative for the El Paso Natural Gas Company. I'm having distributed to you now a 
copy of my prepared remarks which I'll summarize and touch on some of the point that 
you've raised this morning. 
First of all, let me give you the story on why El Paso's situation is unique. El 
Paso, one way or another, is involved in all the plans to bring gas to the EOR market. 
Our two biggest cutomers are sitting over there at the table across from me right now, 
PG&E and SoCalGas. We are a part of the existing gas delivery system to the State of 
California. 
At its peak, to get back to Senator Keene's question, the system in California was 
able to move two customers 6.6 billion cubic feet of gas per day. This was back in the 
late '70s, early 1980s, and all of that capacity was used and El Paso was proYiding 
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4 billion cubic feet per day of capacity on its system, not only to California, but to 
its other customers. That system has slimmed down considerably. The peak now or the 
average delivery in California now is about 4.5 billion cubic feet per day. That's the 
2 billion cubic feet per day of excess that everybody's talking about, but it. was fully 
utilitized just a few years ago. It's excess now because the market has dropped off. 
To the extent that excess system can be used, that's how you regain the benefit to the 
ratepayers. 
A parallel thing happens on the El Paso system. Our system, I said, can deliver 
4 billion a day. It's now delivering less than three, so we have an interest in moving 
a lot more gas to California. We now supply just a little bit less than half of all the 
gas used by California. We're a major supplier to both PG&E and SoCal. 
Now El Paso supports prompt and effective service to the market in Kern County for 
EOR production and we intend to participate in it in one way or another. But ultimately, 
how that market is served depends not on what El Paso wants, what the PUC wants, what 
PG&E and SoCal wants, but what the customer needs. The very basic fact is that those 
customers in the San Joaquin Valley represent a large enough demand for gas in a small 
confined geographic area that they can justify the construction of a new pipeline. That 
is not an opportunity open to many other industrial markets in the State of California 
and one of the reasons you haven't seen a lot of other pipelines coming in here trying to 
build their networks to serve individual markets is they're just too diffuse. This one is 
near the end of the interstate gas system already that ends at the Colorado River, and 
it's very large and very compact. 
The fact that you can bring a private line, as you put it, in here says that that's 
the standard of service. That's the bogie that everybody else who wants to serve that 
market must meet. The unanswered question we have to date is has what the PUC proposed 
in it's draft order met that challenge? We don't know because the customers haven't said 
yet whether it's good enough. We have a draft order put out by the PUC, comments on that 
draft order which suggest, request other changes, but we don't have an answer yet as to 
whether it's good enough. It's probably going to be some time before we even know the 
answer to that question. 
My guess would be that nobody's going to commit the state service permanently and 
nobody's going to commit to the interstate's permanently very early in the next year. 
It's probably going to be the end of next year before those commitments are made. 
I'd like to point out one other thing that hasn't necessarily come across to you. 
None of the interstate up here have a commitment from anybody to ship gas for them. None 
of us have any customers. The only things that exist right now are what Fred John talked 
about, that is there are agreements pending to move gas over the intrastate system for 
Shell and Texaco, and parallel agreements with El Paso to move that gas for Shell and 
Texaco, I might add. El Paso also has an agreement with a third EOR party to bring gas 
in that doesn't currently have an agreement with SoCal and it's pending the outcome of 
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the PUC decision. So that system .. and pieces o.f it ar.e beginning t.o fall, into place, but 
those components--the transportation on El Paso system--are consistent, either with a 
new interstate line or the existing intrastate line. 
El Paso prefers to see the EOR market served by transportation to the existing 
California utilities and therefore we really support what the PUC is trying to do here. 
I.Jhy do ~;.;re do that? We're part of the existing system. It's very simple. It's by that 
route that the benefits, in our view, of additional gas use in California are going to be 
most widely shared. However, if an interstate pipeline is necessary to meet the custo-
mer requirements, then we believe that it should be one that to the maximum extent 
utilizes the surplus capacity of the existing interstate system. By that option the 
benefits of added California gas use are still returned as cost savings to California 
customers. Why? Because it increases the through-put on the lines that are already 
serving you--El Paso's and Transwestern's--and those benefits flow back to the ratepayers 
here. 
To this end, El Paso is in partnership with H.N.G. Internorth and Pacific Lighting to 
build the Mohave Pipeline if it's necessary. I might also that the ElDorado Pipeline 
that was just described to you also connects to the end of the El Paso system and the 
Transwestern system. It's nearly a clone. And so it would utilize those existing inter-
state facilities. The Kern River gas transmission proposal does not. It's an all new 
line. 
Now not only has El Paso already signed agreements to move gas for EOR producers, 
we have also filed to do what we call "debottlenecking" our system to increase its 
capacity to deliver gas. 
lines move to California. 
You have raised questions about how much can the existing 
There really isn't a whole lot of problem moving gas on El 
Paso's main line to the Colorado River where it's facilities end. There is a problem 
getting gas into it's main line, it's coming in through the connections from systems 
outside. So we have filed an application to increase our capacity to accept third party 
gas by 400,000,000 cubic feet per day. You remember the market is about 1.2 billion. 
The 400,000,000 up-rate is going to cost us about $12 million. In terms of our total cost 
of service, that's a very low number. It will be very easy to expand the system. 
Now another question has been raised. Well, how do you get more gas from Canada and 
the Rocky Mountains into your system? In this application we've also indicated how that 
could be done if shippers want to do it. That particular option would increase our 
capability to deliver by 600,000,000 cubic feet per day, the full capacity of Mohave and 
El Dorado. That costs $63 million. 
SENATOR KEENE: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator. 
SENATOR KEENE: Capacity is ~ne issue and the ability to deliver the required 
amounts. Another issue I suppose is that of control and who controls the capacity and 
wilnt th<• cost of that control is to th<:> consumC'r. T don't nH'<ln to rt'opctl old wounds, hut 
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the the California Public Utilities rather to refresh my recollection 
Commission to control transmission costs to customers and the ultimate customers, the 
consumer. What is that and if it isn 
competition in the transmission be desirable? 
duce that capacity, wouldn't the consumer be 
then have to contend with in 
to protect the consumer, wouldn't 
you have the to pro-
that you would 
MR. SIMON: It's a close where greater benefit lies, Senator. El Paso, 
institutionally, is on both sides of the fence. It would love to see the existing system, 
including that within the state, used to the maximum extent under the supervision of the 
PUC but it also recognizes that the customer may be here and he may not accept 
that in which case Mohave, or an alternative, may be what s eventually built. And in that 
case you have lost potentially some control, but it may not be, as Commissioner Gandara 
has raised, bad. It may be that a redistribution of where burdens fall now may result in 
a more fair system. This is the argument that s raised in favor of deregulation 
and greater competition in 
I don't know how good the 
already a tremendous amount of 
within the country and it seems to be 
are that 
and util 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, but you have a virtual 
and airlines, but there is 
ity competition going on 
over the transmission of natural 
gas into California as far as the EOR consumers are concerned. 
MR. SIMON: Well, no, we don't have a because currently we share that 
market \vith Transwestern, Pacific Gas Transmission, and other intrastate and offshore pro-
ducers. But let me go that. the Federal Regulatory Commis-
sion in its attempt to the natural gas has created a structure whereby 
p ines like El Paso simply become railroads. We don't own the goods. We move them for 
anybody who comes up and meets the conditions of the tariff. It's called open access 
transoort. El Paso, in recent letter to Commissioner Vial and its customers, has committed 
that July 1, 1986, once we've negotiated a number of arrangements to just make sure we 
know where we are with our customers, will carry gas for anybody. So in other 
words we're control over who's gas on the system and we're just pub-
a As long as you pony up with the gas at one of our inlet facilities, 
we 11 carry it for a flat rate. 
SENATOR KEENE: But who's to say that the 
MR. SIMON: Well, because other 
the FERC has said that the you 
called allocated costs, and those 
can 
now are 
is without competition in the 
similar services and because 
go beyond what's 
to be low for El Paso. 
It's 19 cents per million btu to move gas 2,000 miles from Texas to California. 
SENATOR KEENE: Would the same be true then for other interstate pipelines seeking 
to get into competition in this business? 
MR. SIMON: Yes. Other pipelines will probably follow suit but the problem is you're 
in a transition period now and the crystal ball is a little murky. You can't tell exactly 
who will be choosing to go that open access route and when, but our guess would be that 
most of the industry will go that route eventually. 
SENATOR KEENE: Then if those people choose to make that investment and that invest-
ment doesn't create an additional burden on the consumer, why shouldn't they be allowed 
to do so? 
MR. SIMON: You mean the additional investment of a Mohave-type pipeline? 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes. 
MR. SIMON: I think you hit the nail on the head. I don't know that there's any way 
you can prevent them from doing it legally. The way that you prevent them from doing it is 
offering them competing service which is as good as or better from the existing utilities. 
That's what the whole issue is about, is whether or not you can match what you call a 
private pipeline can do with the existing system. The benefit of going with the existing 
system is then you're making some additional money off of it that spreads the fixed costs 
farther or reduces the rates, depending on how you want to look at this. But that's the 
issue that I think you've confronted squarely and our point is the customer is going to 
know it for probably several months. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. I'll stop asking questions. I'm still trying to sort out the 
economics of all of that. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: This may be a good point to introduce Don Vial, President of the 
PUC, who while he did not hear all that took place before, probably can guess. [Laughs.] 
And so, welcome. 
MR. DON VIAL: Thank you. I do apologize for being late. I have picked up enough 
since I've been here to realize that we probably have heard it all before. In fact, 
that's what we're wrestling with in the Public Utilities Commission. There are vast 
changes taking place, just in the structure of the gas industry on the production and dis-
tribution side. The same kind of changes basically that are taking place in telecommunica-
tions and electricity. And the policy control is not just in California because what is 
involved here is national policy as well. National policy, in fact, preempts in many ways 
the policy options that we have at the state level. 
So what we are looking at today is the changes that are coming down the track in this 
industry and trying to deal with it in the most economic way, constructive way, so that 
all of the ratepayers benefit from what is perceived to be out there--a lot of oppor-
tunities for the reduction of gas costs. So our objective in the PUC has been to under-
stand fully what the national policy is of deregulation and the introduction of competi-
tion to carry out the deregulatory thrust, and what it means for us and the options that 
we have in California in providing for the distribution of whatever benefits that may 
exist in this evolving system. 
One of the benefits of this evolving system thus far is an apparent abundance of 
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gas and reduction of prices at this , but we're not sure how long this gas 
bubble is going to last. The distributing utilities have responsibilities not only for 
participating in the short-term spot market and the benefits of this gas bubble 
to all ratepayers in accordance with our 
to the long-term and the reliab 
to deal with those complex issues. 
of 
also have responsibility of 
in the future. Our policies have 
I think what is really apparent is whenever you move toward a deregulated environ-
ment with transportation involved in it on a common carrier basis, a contract carriage 
basis, that there are certain groups of consumers that have more market power than others. 
And it's clear from what's been said here today that the EOR market is in an extremely 
powerful ion and, in fact, if we don t for or provide for 
sales gas to meet the needs of the EOR market, there will be we have all recognized 
to be uneconomic bypass of the distribution system. And there is consensus, I 
believe, in California that the cheapest and most effective way to reach the EOR market is 
through the existing distribution system. Therefore, it challenges us in the PUC to look 
at our policies to make sure that the most economic way of reaching that EOR market is 
provided for. And that is why in a basic way that we have opted at this time for moving 
toward a transportation proposal for California. That's why we floated it for considera-
tion of all the parties. 
Now we are looking at transportation in the context of commitments. There 
are many users outside of the EOR market that see the gas bubble and would like to 
in the spot market and 
basis. If we were to 
oy the benefits of transportation on a cost of 
accede to that interest of going to short-term 
spot market , we could undermine the of the distributing utilities to 
part in that spot market and br the benefits of that spot market to everybody. 
So we're not interested in reaching those who want shot-term advantages of 
in a spot market because those that want to participate on that basis, as 
soon as the spot market turns sour want to on the distribnt utility to be 
there to meet their needs. It seems to me that that 1 s not quite fair unless you have some 
in there for getting back into the system. 
So what we have focused on in our is the long-term transportation of gas 
and in order to do that effectively we have to have some symmetry between the transporta-
tion tariff that we establish and the sales rate design that exists, because 
there is what you've been calling the contribution to the margin involved in this. We 
don't want to be encouraging decisions to be to transportation tariffs for uneco-
nomic reasons and to leave the sales tariff. Therefore, we have proposed that 
the long-term, that those who want to make a commitment to securing their own 
gas and, by the same token, relieving the utilities, the distributing utilities of the 
commitment to serve that, to get that supply for them to a large measure, that they 
should have the opportunity to do so so long as the contribution to the margin is the 
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same as they would otherwise be making. 
Se we have linked in our proposal the transportation tariff to the sales price for 
the classification of the class involved, and the incremental cost of long-term supply to 
the distributing utilities. And we have floated that on the basis of whether it should be 
a firm rate or rate that fluctuates on a six-month basis, and we have also raised the 
question of whether we should include demand charges in that calculation, or whether or 
not to include it. That would involve the cost of transportation. 
Now we did that because we realize in the long-run if we are going to provide for 
the advantages of transportation to all, that we have to have it compatible with the rate 
design for sales gas which, in turn, our transportation order then suggests that we need 
to look at whether that rate design that we have today is an adequate rate design and a 
fair rate design given the fact that there is a change in structure in this industry and 
the greater reliance on market forces gives a lot more market power to those who have 
greatest elasticity of demand, in economic terms, either in their ability to fuel switch 
or in their ability to bring gas into California through a FERC-approved line that would 
bypass our jurisdiction. That possibility of a FERC-approved line in fact becomes the 
maximum value of gas transportation for the EOR market for us and we recognize that fact 
of life in our order and that is why we set a transportaion tariff of 3.5 cents per therm 
for the EOR market, because we feel that that is the rate that would make it possible for 
our California utilities to provide for transportation of customer-owned gas to the EOR 
market competitively with an industrial line approved by FERC, and thereby avoid what we 
believe would be uneconomic bypass of the present system. 
So to sum up, and I've given you a prepared statement that goes into, I think, con-
sistently into all the things that we took into consideration in arriving at our trans-
portation proposal, we are in fact trying to adjust to the changes in national policy in 
a way that will be most beneficial to California ratepayers taking into consideration the 
market power of those who have the options to bring in the gas directly through a FERC 
line, and running the risk of redistributingfixed costs on that basis for the rest of us, 
or developing a system that would take advantage as much as possible of the supposed gas 
glut as this time, provide for transportation on a long-term basis, and protect the margin 
contribution of the network, and at the same time leave the door open for long-term 
changes in rate design which may be indicated by the changes that are taking place. 
Basically, that is what we have done in our proposal. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask a question. How does your proposal meet the oil 
companies' concern about a guaranteed supply? Their uninterrupted service? 
MR. VIAL: Well, we have a section of the order on Page 33 and 34 that deals with 
curtailment, diversion, and priority system and we point out that in the event of supply 
shortages the transportation customer still receives its entire volume except during 
emergency situation. It's in the event of capacity shortages that firm transportation 
customers are served to the same extent as retail customers of the same priority, and 
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that I think iswhere the problem lies. There is a clear advantage in that respect to an 
interstate pipeline and we recognize that at the top of Page 34 of our order, if you want 
to look at it. 
So what we conclude at this point, and let me just read this to you because I think 
it's important to recognize that we in the Commission want to provide as much predictability 
and assurance to the EOR market as possible, but we want to do it in a way that's consis-
tent with some of the principles that I was outlining before. This is what we say, "We 
recall that the priority system was originally intended to classify gas customers based 
upon their ability to switch alternate fuels. The EOR producers in the Kern River area 
are constrained in their ability to switch from natural gas to crude oil to a far greater 
degree than the electric generating steam plants of the utilities, for example. Thus it 
would see that adjustment of the priority system to correct this situation may be appro-
priate. We'll also consider alternative means of insuring that transportaion customers 
who are not easily able to switch from gas to alternative fuels are protected during cur-
tailment situations. One such proposal which is under consideration would permit low 
priority customers who are transporting their own gas, such as EOR customers, to have a 
r to purchase gas during curtailment situations at the sales normally charged that 
class of customers which is still receiving service under the curtailment." 
In other words, during a capacity curtailment situation which resulted in the cur-
tailment of load to priorities, P-7, P-6, P-5, and P-4, the EOR producers could continue 
to receive gas service by purchasing gas to meet their needs at the regular P-3 price. 
Now I know that isn't a complete answer to them and they'd like something better, but 
we do say is that we recognize that there are some issues here and some problems and 
we' asked for comments on this specific issue, and in our final order we will be 
that issue. We are very serious about providing a realistic alternative to 
a FERC line, not because we're just against a FERC line, but because it would be unecono-
mic of the existing distribution system and we have an obligation as a PUC to do 
possible to reach that market in a manner consistent with the interest of other 
And that's exactly what we will do and we will do it to the extent necessary 
under the policies of the United States if we cannot turn those policies around 
to make them more beneficial to California and this is where we think they can be improved. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: How can you be certain that a bypass of the existing facilities will 
be uneconomic and how could it continue to be uneconomic if in being uneconomic it couldn't 
compete with the existing distribution system? 
MR. VIAL: I'm not sure--you want to repeat it? 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes. How can you be certain that bypassing the existing distribution 
system would be uneconomical? And if it were uneconomic, how can it continue to compete 
with existing distribution systems? 
MR. VIAL: Well, if it were uneconomic bypass it would be promoted by our failure to 
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recognize market forces and this is really what we're involved in. When the policy 
nationally is to defer to market forces and to implement a transportation system that 
recognizes the elasticities of demand in the real marketplace, if we don't recognize those 
forces in our own rate design then there is going to be bypass because it's going to be 
more economic to do it the other way. So we are constrained. All I'm really saying here 
is we are constrained whether we like it or not to meet the alternatives that are available 
and being made available by national policy. To that extent it's uneconomic for us not to 
do so because there'll be a more economic way. 
If we have an artificial rate design that doesn't recognize market forces, they're 
going to bypass it and we have to recongize market forces here whether we like it or not. 
And I kick and scream all the way sometimes when I see the impact of the potential for 
shifting fixed costs in a manner adverse to a lot of customers as a result of these market 
forces that are now given full play. Because remember, whenever you rely increasingly on 
market forces you are in fact deferring to those who have the most market power and those 
in turn are going--the way they exercise that power or that elasticity of demand is going 
to have a large impact on how the existing fixed costs of the distribution system are 
going to be spread. What's going on in telephone, what's going on in gas is a potential for 
redistributing fixed costs away from the large users, from those who have more market power, 
greater elasticity demand to those who have less. That's the name of the game and we have 
to deal with that fact. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. I think I understand that concept. I listened closely to what 
you just said and I've been listening to this problem all morning and I can't hook the 
two up. 
MR. VIAL: Well, I'm not sure. The problem is that we have to make an adjustment in 
existing pricing policies in order to accommodate an evolving market that has a lot of 
bucks in it and everybody want to get into, including our own distributing utilities. And 
our own distributing utilities are urging us in the PUC to develop compatible policies 
so that they can serve that market effectively, either by transportation or by sales gas. 
PG&E's been interested more in sales gas and SoCal's been putting more of an emphasis on 
transportation. We have come down on the side of transportation because we believe that's 
reality but we are also keeping the door open for sales gas alternatives that would be 
compatible with the policy that's evolving. We must adjust our pricing policies to deal 
with the reality that there is now under national policy a group of potential customers 
who have an awful lot of market power. They have their own gas to bring in. They can 
bring it in under federal policies, or we are going to accommodate them to bring it in. 
All we're trying to do is the least cost analysis to make sure that our utilities have an 
opportunity to provide that service and that we do it in a way that maximizes as much as 
possible a fair contributionto the margin to maintain the existing distribution system. 
I keep going around the same answer. I'm not sure .•. 
SENATOR KEENE: Because you would like to see the existing system be sufficiently 
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competitive that new systems will not come onto the scene. 
MR. VIAL: Yes. And the reason is that if we appear to be resisting a FERC industrial 
line coming into California, it's because we know that that's the beginning of the seg-
mentation of demand in the industry in a way that inevitably means as the forces play out 
that we must redistribute increasingly some of the fixed costs of the system to those 
with less economic market power. And we have a resistance toward doing that because it 
decreases the options of the Commission in dealing with the social policy that also fre-
quently accompanies regulation of a utility, of a service that is important to all of us. 
SENATOR KEENE: So whether the California utilities as a segment along the way, it 
give the PUC an ability to regulate for what's regarded as beneficial social purposes 
from your standpoint, but you don't have the opportunity to do so with the FERC pipelines? 
MR. VIAL: Well, it would reduce our ability to be in control of rate design and to 
deal with the margins that are necessary to maintain a distributio~ system are diminished 
to the extent that the demand is segmented and we have less control over a lot of the 
margin that would otherwise go to support the network. Remember that when you talk about 
transportation to the EOR market that while a number of the pipelines says they're only 
and exclusively interested in the EOR market, it doesn't take much economic imagination 
to understand that there isn't a heck of a lot of difference between a lot of the incre-
mental customers in the EOR market and a lot of the big industrial users who are chafing 
at the bit to get at cost-based transportation. In fact, one of the largest criticism 
of our order at the present time is by non-EOR market industrial users who feel that they 
have been supporting the network for a long time and are not getting the advantage of the 
transportation that is being made available to the incremental users in the EOR 
market and they're pretty upset about it. 
, in fact, are saying, "We want cost-based transportation," and our response to 
them is "We hear you loud and clear, but we have an existing rate design that is built on 
value of gas, not on cost-based pricing, and that if we have to make some adjustments we 
have to do this in a consistent fashion," and therefore, we've attached to this order a 
dissertation of the issues that we think are important to confront in rate design 
now that we are moving into transportation and must confront a lot of the aspects of the 
sales gas tariff that may not be compatible with the changes that are taking place in the 
environment. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right, thank you very much. In closing, before the lunch 
break, I'd like to get somebody back up here from the oil companies because I have two 
quick questions that could take about two minutes if you give me a direct answer ... 
[Laugher.] ... and could take two hours if you didn't. 
MR. REISNER: Mr. Chairman, Don Reisner again. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Fine. 
MR. REISNER: I have another witness here who can answer some of the questions that 
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have been raised, possibly the question you were thinking of. Mr. Randy McCrae from 
Shell. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, we're going to have my two questions and then we're going 
to break for lunch. Okay? We heard from the Energy Commission a concept of why pro-
duce the oil now? Why do we need more oil? Can you give me a quick answer? 
MR. RANDY McCRAE: I think even though my expertise is in the area of natural gas I 
can comment briefly on that. My name for the record is Randy McCrae, I'm a staff natural 
gas representative with Shell Oil Company in Houston. 
Certainly Mr. Gandara indicated that there was some benefit to the national security 
and a reduction of reliance on imports by the increased production of oil here in the 
United States, and even though there are broad policy implications for the nation in his 
question, I think there is certainly a benefit to the nation by whatever incremental 
production of oil that can be achieved. 
Certainly, the other answer to this question I believe, or your question, is that 
there's certainly a benefit to California in producing that oil as it contributes to the 
national energy security in creating jobs and tax base and everything else that it brings 
to the state. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You haven't convinced me. Now I don't know whether somebody 
else has a different answer, but the other question is one is very significant in terms 
of air pollution. The Kern County Air Pollution Control District has asked you to cut 
your NOx emissions by 50 percent. Are you prepared to do that? 
MR. McCRAE: As far as Shell is concerned, Se~ator, we're continuing and we have met 
all the guidelines that are on us. We are burning right now, Shell is burning a large 
amount of gas at all facilities where we have connections and where it is economically 
available we are burning gas right now to contribute to that effort and to reduce those 
emissions. I cannot speak for any of the other companies but Shell has certainly made a 
large effort to do that and meet those requirements. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any other oil company want to give me a quick answer? Are you 
prepared to reduce your NOx emissions by 50 percent? 
MR. REICHARDT: Terry Reichardt with Chevron. I can't give you a yes or a no answer 
to that. I believe that our emissions are consistent with the current requirements. I 
believe we're in conformance. I would like to state that in terms of whatever amount of 
heavy oil it is economic to produce, there will be less emissions if it's done with the 
natural gas rather than with crude oil. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What if part of the arrangement was that if you had this pipe-
line, you'd have to cut emissions from your other operations? What would be the answer? 
MR. REICHARDT: From our other operations other than heavy oil? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. You know, in the area. You've got to, you know, they say 
you've got to cut NOx 50 percent. They don't tell you which plant has to do that. 
MR. REICHARDT: We would like to convert to natural gas. If we had a pipeline, we'd 
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like to convert our steam generators from crude oil to natural gas. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But you haven't indicated whether you would cut NOx 50 percent. 
MR. REICHARDT: I don't know the answer to that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All 
SENATOR KEENE: I just wondered if because of the order of presentations being 
reversed--I still have some issues interested in where I would like to hear a rebuttal, 
if possible, from some of the FERC pipeline people to Mr. Vial's testimony. I don't 
know whether they should be requested to submit papers, or what. I know we're out of 
time for the presentation. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, if we could get some quick answers, I wouldn't mind doing 
it now, or else they can present papers. 
MR. CARTER: I would suggest that the questions be specified and some written 
responses be made, if that's possible. It might be more efficient time wise and might 
get you some better answers and then if you have further questions, we could convene again. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, because I was listening to your position within the context of 
not having President Vial, then I heard him and I'm kind of interested in hearing what 
your response is to that. 
MR. CARTER: · And I would love to give you that but my concern is that the 
time would not be efficiently utilized. You've got another hearing and a lunch break. 
I think we're going to run into a real time problem. 
nia 
SENATOR KEENE: Maybe some written submissions would be useful. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. We will break until two o'clock. 
[Break.] 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Very good. Good timing. Mr. Imbrecht, Chairman of the Califor-
Commission, and Mr. Pugh, Chairman of Management, California/Oregon Trans-
mission Project. Why don't you join us. The discussants on this side, Don Vial, Com-
missioner of Public Utilities, Douglas Oglesby, Attorney for PG&E, and I guess we have no 
representative from SoCal Edison at this point. 
This afternoon our focus shift to electricity. California's electricity future 
seems to be moving us away from being electricity producers to becoming energy consumers, 
power from our neighboring states. Evidence for this is the proposal 
before us for discussion today. 
A consortium of private and public utilities is planning to build another major 
transn1ission line to the Northwestern United States in order to enable more imports from 
this region and greater competition among electricity producers. But the history of power 
from the Northwest suggests to me that this new transmission may be a direct line to 
extortion. [Laughs.) Power from the Northwest has escalated in price about 800 percent 
in the last six years. Another line will make us even more captive to this unpredictable 
market. 
Our speakers today are directly involved in planning this new line. I ask them to 
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tell us of the guarantees we can get that power from this line will be reasonably priced, 
and advise us of what we need to do to protect ratepayers in California from the whimsy 
of our northern neighbors. 
Energy Commission Chairman Imbrecht will open our discussion with a status report. 
I also invite our panel of discussants to the front of the room, which I've already done, 
to comment and to raise questions. With that, Mr. Imbrecht. 
~ffi. CHARLES IMBRECHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. Again, I appreciate the 
opportunity to be with you this afternoon. 
I think that probably it would be useful if we went directly to one of the premises 
behind the statement that was included in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, which really 
lies at the heart of the confusion, if you will, about the efficacy of the third Northwest 
intertie on the AC side, as well the upgrades to the DC line. Because while I appreciate 
on the surface how you might reach the conclusion that you suggested, I'd like to suggest 
to you instead that actually it is the current situation that in fact puts California in 
a sellers marketplace, if you will, from the perspective of the Northwest, and it is the 
current situation that has made it possible for the Bonneville Power Administration and 
the other utilities in the Pacific Northwest to increase rates to California over the last 
few years. 
The reason for that is as a practical matter the best way to try to imagine this is 
we have an inadequate extension cord that exists between California and the Pacific North-
west. Today the current extension cords, the two AC Northwest intertie lines, which were 
constructed in the early and mid-1960s, are filled to capacity virtually the entire year. 
As a consequence, despite the fact that there is an abundant surplus of economy energy 
available both from the states in the Pacific Northwest--1'11 get to the reasons for that 
in a few moments--as well as from our neighbors in British Columbia and to a lesser ex-
tent in the Province of Alberta as well, that because of limited transmission capacity 
there is no actual market competition for the prices of power that are sold to California, 
because of the fact that there are more parties with power to sell, trying to squeeze onto 
a line that has an inability to carry the totality of the surplus energy from the Pacific 
Northwest. That as a practical matter eliminates competition. 
That has also as a practical matter made it possible for the Bonneville Power 
Ad1ninistration to enunciate something we and the Public Utilities Commission have con-
sistently opposed in both regulatory and judicial forums, and that is something known as 
the intertie axis policy which seeks to further limits and allocate shares of existing 
line between the parties in the Northwest, in essence market shares. From our perspective, 
almost a classic antitrust violation where we're talking about a free enterprise system, 
allocate those market shares in terms of sales to California. That has made it possible 
further for the Bonneville Power Administration to in essence dictate a for-price, for-
sales to California by virtue of them enunciating a price and then allocating the 
remaining shares on the line, there is obviuosly no incentive for other utilities in the 
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Northwest to compete in the marketplace for sales to California. The Bonneville enuncia-
ted price becomes the de facto regionwide price. 
What we seek to do by virtue of construction of a third Northwest intertie on the AC 
side in conjunction with the DC upgrade that runs down from Nevada that has been announced 
in a cooperative project between Southern California Edison and Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power, is several fold. 
First and foremost is to expand the access of all utilities and in turn, therefore, 
the ratepaying public of the state, the entirety of the ratepaying public, not just those 
who participate because their servicing utilities have a current share of the highway, if 
you will, that access to the energy markets in the Northwest and British Columbia. 
Secondly, we anticipate that that will enhance rather than diminish the competition 
for sales to the state. 
Third, the physical changes in the system have been demonstrated in many technical 
forums to substantially, if not dramatically, increase the realiability of the entire 
Western transmission grid. We here in California have our own loop, if you will, and that 
is a rough oval of transmission capacity that runs from the northern portion of the state 
doW11 to the southern portion of the state. There are two other loops that exist west of 
the Rockies, all of which are tied into our system and without getting into a complex 
discussion like we did a week ago, suffice it to say that if there is a physical breakage 
anywhere in the system, it can have profound impacts; not just in that same geographical 
locale, but literally throughout the entire Western United State. 
An incident that's in utility circles that's reflected upon most regularly is the 
so-called Leap Year Blackout on February 29 of '84, where a break in the system at the 
Oregon/California border produced blackouts as far away I believe as Phoenix, Arizona 
and Colorado and throughout the entire Western grid. 
The upgrade of the DC line and the construction of a third AC line will appreciably 
enhance the system reliability and that means the physical guarantee that ratepayers 
throughout the Western United States will enjoy the certainty of supply that makes our 
entire industrial manufacturing base, our style of life, not to mention impact upon our 
low income communities palpable, or I should say reasonable within the current context. 
In addition, we believe that the seasonal exchange opportunities because the Pacific 
Northwest is a winter peaking electric system, that is they use the bulk of their energy, 
the high peak periods, the days of the year when they need the most energy, that occurs 
in the winter for them and for us it occurs during the summer, at least that's the case 
for the vast preponderance of the population in California. And so this enhancement of 
t 
our transmission capacity, in essence the extension cord between the two regions also 
opens up the opportunity in a much greater way than has been the case in the past, for 
seasonal exchanges between the two regions. 
What that means is they can sell us their surplus during the summer, which is 
basically hydroelectric generated surplus. In wet years their dams are brimming to 
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capacity and spill a tremendous amount of hydroelectric capacity over the spillways of 
projects which were constructed with Federal dollars which we in California contributed to 
as did the citizens of the Pacific Northwest. Today that energy is literally wasted in 
facilities where rivers have already been dammed and the environmental consequences have 
been accepted or acclimated or in one fashion or another, and that energy literally pours 
out to the sea despite the fact that it could instead be directed through turbines and sold 
to California. 
Now another I think very important benefit of this project, aside from the prospect 
of producing literally a regional electrical system for the entire Pacific Coast with all 
attendant system reliabilities, strategic considerations, as well as the prospect for sub-
stantial economic benefits for both regions, and that's obviously the crux of the problem 
which I want to speak to last. 
This also has a very positive impact within the utility community in our own state. 
I think one of the things that's frequently overlooked generally when we discuss the 
electric generation system is somehow a perspective that the investor-owned utilities of 
California service all of our population. Frankly, nothing could be further from the case. 
When it comes to electricity only about 70 percent of the citizens in our state are 
serviced by investor-owned utilities, and fully 30 percent of our people are serviced by 
publicly-owned utilities, including the constituents, well many of the constituents which 
each of you represent. That's an aspect of our utility system that doesn't engender the 
same degree of attention frequently, other than the case with respect to investor-owned 
utility issues. 
There has been, suffice it to say, historic disagreement between the public and 
private utilities in the state over access to Pacific Northwest power and the attendant 
benefits to the ratepayers of the state, to the system reliability issues, etc., and by 
the historic agreement that was signed by virtually every utility in our state, both 
public and private, in the Spring of this year, approved by Congress in August and signed 
by the President shortly thereafter as a rider to the Department of Energy appropriation's 
bill this year. This historic agreement not only provides access to that 30 percent of 
the state's population that has largely been deprived of access to the Northwest market-
place in the past through their servicing utilities, but it also, assuming we're able to 
move forward to construction of the line, sets to rest historic and long-standing regu-
latory and judicial agreements between the public and private utility sectors in our 
state. 
There is a case known as the "Quad Seven" which has extended well over a decade 
which deals with these issues, and if the project goes forward to completion as the terms 
of the agreement on the allocation of shares the line, that litigation and that disage-
ment will be set aside. 
Finally, the obvious question is will this make sense from a cost effective stand-
point to the people of this state? Let me simply say in very clear terms that I don't 
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believe there is a single party to the agreement, nor is there a single regulator who has 
any responsibility or jurisdiction with respect to this who has not consistently been 
saying to Pacific Northwest, "This line will not happen unless there is adequate assurance 
with respect to the predictability of price and the assurance of supply over a period 
sufficient to justify the economic investment in the line." 
We think as a practical matter that we have accomplished the bulk of our responsi-
bilities in California and the ball to a certain extent is in the court of the Pacific 
Northwest and largely in the court of the Bonneville Power Administration. Our utilities 
have struck a historic agreement known as the Memorandum of Understanding. Our utilities 
are currently engaged in interconnection agreements that will decide where the actual 
physical transmission connection points actually occur, and there are already bilateral 
with respect to long-term and medium-term contracts over price and supply. 
Nonetheless, there remains the question of how the Bonneville Power Administration will 
effectively utilize its near dominant position, or I should say dominant position in the 
Northwest in terms of rate setting structure. 
We've tried to say to them very clearly, both in the electricity report which was the 
point of some discussion at the last hearing, and obviously there are many other aspects 
besides cogeneration in that report. We've said to them in that forum, we said to them 
in and judicial proceedings, etc., that now is the time to fish or cut bait. 
That we have gone the extra mile, that we have put our parties together in California in 
a way that's unprecedented, and if you don't come to terms on the price/ supply issues in 
next six months, or thereabouts, as a practical matter what you will force California 
is to build other generation capacity. For example, the cogeneration projects that 
we discussed at the last meeting, along with a wide range of projects that we've also 
mentioned to you are currently in the planning horizon, much of which is well beyond the 
stage and has signed contracts and is at the point where it's either about to 
file for certification for construction, or we'll go through other regulatory pro-
cesses beyond the Energy Commission or the PUC's jurisdiction. That that capacity will be 
built and as a consequence the marketplace here in Caifornia will be lost to you, not just 
the new marketplace, that is the potential, but also in a very real sense much of the 
exist marketplace because of the types of new energy generation which we are adding to 
our own system within our state. 
Finally, where does this leave us? The ball is to some extent in their court. There 
have been a number of ongoing discussions involving the highest level of our regulatory and 
our utility community, both private and public. More of those meetingsare frankly 
scheduled in the next few weeks, and I would have to put it to you in this context--we 
are cautiously optimistic that they are going to understand the realities. And assuming 
they do, then in fact this represents one of the great energy opportunities for the 
of our state, as well as for the people of the Pacific Northwest. It literally is 
a situation from an economic standpoint which clearly can pencil out to be a win, win for 
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both regions. 
What we've said to the people in the Pacific Northwest and the great diffusion they 
have there, and if you think we have a lot of utility interests in California, let me 
invite you to join me on a trip to the Northwest and you'll find that the 90 to 100 
interests that produced "WHOOPS" (Washington Public Power Supply System--WPPSS) are still 
very much on the scene today; that, in fact, they have an opportunity to serve their own 
citJzuns 1 ikl~ we, that wu are looking for a deal that roughly divides the benefits between 
the two regions. We're confident that that can be the case. 
And finally, I'd just like to tie this afternoon's conversation into this morning's 
discussion because I think it is important to realize that each of these energy sectors 
do not operate in a vacuum from one another. They are very much related. And in fact 
what has occurred on the natural gas side, the deregulation of domestic natural gas, the 
reduced prices, etc., acts as a practical matter as an economic cap on what, on the price 
that Pacific Northwest can sell electricity to California for. Obviously, our utilities 
that have generation capacity are not going to buy surplus from the Northwest if they can 
generate it within their own systems, even with natural gas for example, at a lower cost. 
It is that threshold Northwest has to compete with. I think there are enough players in 
the Northwest that understand that and I also believe that there is enough diversity 
within the utility systemsin California. Rate differences between our private and public 
utilities who has generation capacity, who does not, who has access to the Northwest, who 
does not, who has peak or baseload generation capacity, etc., that with a line in place 
there will be ample opportunities for a broad range of our utility interests to demon-
strate economic justification. 
I applaud and I might say also very much accept, and it's probably not the right 
term--I not only accept, but expect, as the PUC has rightfully enunciated their responsi-
bility to ensure that our investor-owned utilities strike a deal that's prudent for the 
interest of their ratepayers, and we're trying to do that with them with the investor-
owned utilities and also trying to assist our publicly-owned utilties in that same regard. 
I'd be happy to give you any genral background about the role of the Administration or the 
Governor in this entire discussion. It has been ongoing for slightly in excess of two 
years presently. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me just say, Mr. Imbrecht, I'm concerned about the bottom 
line. I'm concerned about the prospect of increased competition lowering the sales rate 
by Bonneville to California. I'm also concerned about long-term contracts and so in 
light of those two concerns and what came out of our last hearing in which we're now 
facing a surplus of electricity in California, few new power projects are being planned 
because of sufficient resources to meet the in-state demands. What are really the 
opportunities [or us to sell surplus electricity produced in California to tl1e Northwest 
as part of this exchange in this regional concept? I don't really see it. 
MR. IMBRECHT: Well, the opportunities have to do with the fact that they are a 
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hydroelectric dominant system and as we well know, hydro power varies tremendously from 
year to year depending upon level of rainfall. And the last year actually their hydro 
system has been deplenished in a very large sense. They have actually had to rely upon 
British Columbia to supply some of the imported power purchase needs of utilities in 
California. When you talk about seasonal changes we're talking about California being 
able to use some of its baseload capacity in the winter when it doesn't need that genera-
tion capacity to sell to the Northwest and back their system up. It provides in essence a 
guarantee for them just as they can provide a guarantee to us during the summer months 
because that's when the Spring runoff occurs, when their dams are filled, and when they're 
in a position to sell us hydroelectric power almost irrespective of what the level of rain-
fall might be. Now obviously, that's not the case if it's a drought-type year, but in 
ter~s of average conditions that is the situation. 
At issue for them--if they have a very wet year, that means they can sell surplus to 
us for much longer periods. If they have a medium year, that cuts off earlier in the 
Spring. 
In terms of what it means for our ratepayers in terms of price and whether that makes 
sense versus building genration capacity within our own states, let's put this in a little 
bit of perspective. 
Cl~IRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, but it was indicated at the last hearing that we don't need 
any more facilities, we don't any more electricity in California. 
MR. IMBRECHT: No, what we said the last time--no, that's not quite true. What we 
said at the last hearing is we need 6,350 megawatts of additional capacity in the next 
period, and we have identified on the drawing boards substantially more than that, 
both in terms of capacity and energy, projects that are under contemplation for construc-
tion. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right. 
MR. IMBRECHT: The question is should we allow a very expensive project to be built 
in California if we can meet those energy needs by long-term purchases of inexpensive 
energy from neighboring regions. And if you want to look at it from the perspective of 
environmental consequences, don't we really have some obligation to look at regional 
interests as well? Do we build in California to generate when there is already developed 
capacity right at our border? 
Interestingly, when the Northwest intertie was built, three lines were brought down 
to the Oregon/California border. Only two were constructed from there into the San Fran-
cisco region. We're really just talking about completing the system, if you will, that 
was begun in the 1960s. I guess the point I want to make to is no deal is going to work 
unless they can meet what in essence is the marginal costs of gas generation, which I 
guarantee you is lees than the cost of building new generation and it's certainly in the 
neighborhood of 60 to 70 percent maximum cost of new generation, that's assuming the most 
cost effective new projects only being approved. 
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Under almost any scenario if the deal is going to work you're talking about sales to 
California of energy that is substantially less expensive than anything that we can bring 
on-line in California, with the possible exception of geothermal. And that's what it 
really comes down to. Do we want to give our ratepayers the benefit of what is roughly 
the equivalent of two nuclear plants in terms of generation over a 15 to 20-year period? 
In terms of rate savings I think that the answer if you look at it from an economic stand-
point is obvious, assuming, and that's the one assumption that's left, that Bonneville 
Power Administration understands and recognizes these realities and comes to terms with 
them in their rate structure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: I understand the carrot part of the equation that says its a win/win 
for both sides if it gets put together. You also had a stick part that we had some 
leverage with them and what kind of leverage is it to say that if you don't enter into a 
partnership or a contract arrangement with us on this, why we're going to go ahead and 
build domestically. Is that real leverage? 
MR. IMBRECHT: Yes, indeed, it is real leverage because today the Pacific Northwest, 
and one of the reasons that there is some caution about going forward is because they're 
a region that has suffered very immense economic problems--the timber industry and you're 
certainly familiar with the problems that they've experienced. 
SENATOR KEENE: ... bring my district into this. You must be a former legislator or 
something. [Laughs.] 
MR. IMBRECHT: I always try to move this around to self-interest. Their timber 
industry has suffered as had Northern California in a very similar fashion because of 
interestingly, Canadian imports I think is a large part of that. Their aluminum indus-
try, their mining industry, etc., is also in a very difficult position. Of the five 
major industries up there, basically the aerospace industry appears to be the only one 
currently that is in a reasonably healthy situation. And because of the critical role we 
play in terms of the total economics--and again I'm going off in some detail and stop me 
when you like--but the Bonneville Power Administration is a TVA or Tennessee Valley 
Authority-type institution. The Columbia River system projects were constructed with 
Federal tax dollars. They have had an outstanding debt to the Federal treasury. I don't 
frankly know how long it's going to go but certainly a very long period of time. They 
went through a long period where they did not repay their debt to the Federal treasury. 
There's enormous pressure on them to do that. The reason you've seen some fluctuation in 
the rates to California is largely a perspective of them trying to enhance their ability 
to repay that debt up to the maximum extent possible. 
I think all parties feel thatthey've ~gely reached the ceiling. I just want to put 
this in a little perspective. Though the prices have gone up dramatically, they are still 
below 30 mills for kilowatt hour and if you can find a utility in California that can 
generate power for that, I'd like to see it. The fact of the matter is, there is none, 
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so even with the increases it still is less expensive current generation. What we're 
to you is we believe a deal can be put together, and I think frankly most of the 
parties in the Northwest do that recognizes the economic realities. Certainly many of the 
investor-owned utilities have already said that clearly. 
What we come down to in terms of stick, if you will, is that the types of additions 
we've made to our system that impact·new cogenerators also impact sales from the Northwest, 
baseload generation. As a consequence, it's not just future sales but also existing 
market that is jeopardized. We're doing our best to make that case in a technical and in 
an economic discussion environment in a regulatory body. The semantics are not dissimilar 
from those which occur in front of the Public Utilities Commissionrurl I think we made that 
case as strongly as we can from an intellectual and technical standpoint, and it's really 
a question of them to chew on it for the time being. We're trying to move this forward 
to both public and private discussions. I'm confident that there are enough political 
interests in the Northwest as well as understand these realities thatin fact we're going 
to produce a deal. 
And I would just note for you that this is one of those strange issues. When I first 
arrived in my current position, one of the things I was struck by was the amount of dis-
agreement within the utility and energy community within our own state. Here's an issue 
where we have largely put together those interests and you have people that have been 
historical enemies all marching in the same direction and all understanding the clear 
benefits to their respective ratepayers. I think it would be a pity and frankly, I'll 
offer a judgment in advance a slippage of our public responsibility if we're not able 
put this The only thing that is going to hold it up, quite frankly, is the 
same that I made reference to that seems to produce intransigence in the Northwest 
and other issues, and that is they have so many more parties than we've got in a much 
smaller region. You figure basically in California we've got 40 utilities in round 
numbers. They've got 90-plus and a population in the four states that is less than half 
of our total state population. That's the biggest problem. When you sit down with these 
it's a little bit like negotiating the State Assembly. 
SENATOR KEENE: They haven't yet discovered the advantages of concentration of 
ical power, have they? 
MR. IMBRECHT: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: To what extent is the fact that this energy could displace, what 
14, 18 megawatts of ... 
MR. IMBRECHT: Sixteen hundred AC. We're looking at roughly 1,600 megawatts and the 
DC upgrade, which is a separate project, but frankly the two fit together from an opera-
ting standpoint. Actually the system reliability with the AC/DC combination--I'm not 
sure I want to use that phrase--is enhanced. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay, but to what extent are the environmental concerns really 
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demonstrated in terms of reducing pollutants that would otherwise be produced by co-
generation, by other types? 
MR. IMBRECHT: As we discussed, as I think I made reference to at the last meeting, I 
have yet to discover any energy generation technology that is environmentally benign. 
They each have their negatives whether it be air quality or land intensiveness or aesthe-
tics, or what have you. There are factors with respect to all technologies that are 
problems and I don't want to suggest to you that a transmission line doesn't have its 
own set of problems, but I will also tell you that the project's that contemplated here, 
Mr. Pugh, who's the President of the NCPA and also an elected official, has really been 
one of the key individuals in assisting us and actually taking the lead in putting this 
whole matter together and will talk about the specifi~of the project. Actually, I think 
without prejudging the CEQA process, etc., contemplates the upgrade, the predominant por-
tion of the project will contemplate the upgrade of an existing Western area power admin-
istration line which means minimal new rightaway acquisition, and all the other attendant 
environmental issues ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I was thinking primarily of air pollution. 
MR. IMBRECHT: The major environmental groups in the state have endorsed this 
project, I might add. And another perspective in terms of enhancing the system reliability 
is if we were to build a third AC line parallel to the existing two, the same natural 
disaster takes the whole system out, or the same physical disaster of an airplane crash, 
for example. By moving the third line to a different physical location, we enhance the 
reliability of the system and what does that mean to the people? Well, that's not simply 
an intangible quality. We all take the granted the fact thatour lights stay on on a regu-
lar basis, and so forth, and we take for granted that our industrial base has energy on a 
regular basis. In many countries that's not the case and it's certainly something that 
I've also learned in this position. And there clearly is an economic benefit, as well 
as price that ought to be attributed to that certainty of supply. Because of how we're 
overloading the system, I wouldn't say overloading the system, but we're certainly 
loading the system currently up to its theoretical limits and by doing so we jeopardize 
supply for everyone. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Can you or have you related this completion of all that you pro-
posed to reduce air pollution in any particular part of the state? 
MR. IMBRECHT: No, sir, we have not. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could that be done at some time in the process? 
MR. IMBRECHT: I think it could be done. LF :_ 's just put it in round terms. This 
project alone would account for 25 to 30 percen• of the new capacity needs for the state 
over the next 12-year period and whether that :)e cogeneration--we don't really know what 
the system is going to be. If, as we discuss'::i last week, we were to change our siting 
policies back to the status quo of last Spring, virtually everything that would be built 
in the next few years would be gas fired generation. And I would just also put that 
-50-
in the context of this morning's discussion where there was some discussion about concern 
about the length of time that the gas bubble will exist. That goes back to the point that 
I was trying to make a week and-a-half ago about building into the system reliance upon 
natural gas. I think President Vial referenced some concern of their's about how long 
that bubble's going to last and it affects the cogeneration issue very much. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is most of the need for this extra generating capacity in 
Southern California? The majority of it? 
MR. IMBRECHT: Well, I don't think it's easy to generalize and I wouldn't say that, 
but baseload--there's more base needed in Southern California than there is in Northern 
California large due to the addition of Diablo and Helms, but the difference in the 
interest, Senator Russell, between the variety of our utility interests in the state are 
A to Z. I think Mr. Pugh can probably also better talk about what it means to a 
publicly-owned utility who has had neither access to firm or nonfirm surplus sales from 
the Northwest, how they can economically justify the line simply on the basis of nonfirm, 
much less firm. It can be ••. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, what I'm getting at, Mr. Pugh, if you're going to come on 
next, as Mr. Imbrecht said, this would take care of one-third of the 
potential generating capacity needed in the future. My concern, coming from Southern 
California, where would that one-third primarily be? Heavily in Southern California where 
we have a pollution problem? And if that is the case, I would assume then this addi-
tional electrical generating capacity would address in a favorable way the reduction of 
pollution or the minimizing of pollution by that amount of capacity rather than building 
new facilities, be they cogeneration or whatever? 
MR. IMBRECHT: I think that you've just given Mr. Pugh another issue to add to his 
declaration for the--I don't think it'll be a negative declaration--but for his 
EIR. Mr. Pugh, in addition to being the President of MCPA, a former mayor and member of 
MCPA and currently a member of their council, but is also the head of TANC, which is 
the consortium of interests that has been formed as the transmission agency of Northern 
California. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Pugh. 
MR. IMBRECHT: Maybe he can address some of those. I'll be happy to answer any 
other questions you may have. 
MR. ARCHER PUGH: Thank you, Mr. Imbrecht, Senators. I appreciate the opportunity 
to come talk to you on behalf of both the Transmission Agency of Northern California, 
which I'm Chairman, and the California/Oregon Transmission Project, which I am Chairman 
of the Management Co~~ittee. As Mr. Imbrecht has told you, I'm a councilman from the 
City of Redding. I was formerly a mayor there and have in the past been the Chairman of 
the Northern California Power Agency and I'm currently the Chairman of the Transmission 
Agency of Northern California; was President of MSR, which is another power agency of 
Modesto, Santa Clara and Redding. 
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A little of the background, I think that Mr. Imbrecht has expressed the fact that !:he 
publics started this prog,::am some time ago in an attempt to gain access to the ,\;orthwes: 
which we have never had. Most of the public power agencies in Northern California which 
are involved, there were 15 agencies, were not in the process of generatin[ They were: 
wholesale customers of either the Western Area Power Administration or Pacific Gas and 
Electric. Over the years there has been a tendency to attempt to become an independent 
generator, an independent utility in having the availability of different resources and 
different sources of power. The transmission looked like a vehicle that that could be 
used to attempt to do that and to create that situation. 
In early 1984 we had put together with Western Power Administration a plan which 
would allow us to develop this line and upgrade the Western lines to bring that power in. 
In 1984 we also met with the private utilitie~ in the process of trying to put together 
an agreed program as per direction from Congress, to work together to develop a memorandum 
on how we would participate in the line, what shares would go to the different member 
agencies in the state, and how the line would be basically structured and the function. 
So over a long period of time we met and discussed and negotiated postures within all of 
the agencies in California to come up with a memorandum of understanding which 
set up the methodology of developing this line and how it would be used and function. 
One of the things that the Transmission Agency of Northern California did as a joint 
powers agency when it formed was discuss very definitely what its function was to be, and 
that function was to be only of developing the transmission line. The diversity among 
the members as to what needs they had were the types of energy that they wanted to buy from 
Northwest led us to the posture that we were not an agency that could go up and buy blocks 
of power and use them within the agency. We have many agency members who over the years 
now have developed their own baseload generation. Northern California Power Agency has a 
geothermal power plant going, has another under construction right now. There's a hydro-
electric project under construction. We have, some of the group have purchased coal 
fired generation by buying part of a plant in New Mexico. and we have a number of those 
vehicles available. 
So the needs of the different agencies were such that no one felt it was necessary 
or available to have bulk purchases by an agency itself, so we have gone under the basis 
that we looked at the Northwest as the abilitj to supply our individual needs. Each of 
us have done our own studies and our own concepts of how we can economically portray this 
program. The economics were there for most o~ the public utilities strictly to buy 
summer peak capacity. Summer peak capacity is a very available and valuable resource and 
is available in Northwest. 
Exchange programs, such as those that have been entered into in the past by L.A.D.W.P. 
and Southern Cal Edison with the Northwest, ,.,,~re also vehicles that we could look to with 
our baseload generation which is excess in th~ wintertime, be able to use an exchange 
program. 
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Again, one of the things I think that's been very valuable in this process, as Mr. 
Imbrecht expressed, was the ability for the first time and since I've been involved in 
ic power and I got involved in 1974 when I was first appointed as the commissioner 
from the City of Redding, to be able to sit down, not with all the publics at the 
same table in California, but to sit down with the publics and the privates and work 
to develop a project which all of us felt independently in our own studies was a 
ect that would benefit the citizens and the ratepayers in California. 
I think Mr. Imbrecht has expressed to some degree the impacts which we are discussing 
with the Northwest on the price of power. We firmly believe that an interconnection with 
the Northwest that is tied to a location and a place that give us access to all of the 
different utilities in the Northwest is going to create a competition up there as well. 
What you have currently with the connection at Malin is a connection with Bonneville Power 
Authority, and as long as you re only connected to Bonneville everything else, as Mr. 
Imbrecht said, funnels through them. We feel that the third AC line is going to be 
structured in such a manner that we will have access to other entities in the Northwest 
who we can then buy from independetly. And those kinds of things create competition, not 
for the types of power whether you want surplus energy, whether you want firm, whether 
you vvant summer peak capacity, whether you're exchanging for energy, those kind of things 
can be worked out down the contracts with the agencies and you can take and pick which 
of those has the best deal, which of those have the kinds of surpluses and needs that you 
have, which have the energy you want who has the capacity you want, how you can use it 
for reserves. Those are the kinds of things that we're looking for. 
So the agency with the lOU's the memorandum of understanding which split 
this process into being. We have since gone through that process to the environmental 
contracts. We're in the process now of environmental studies for the whole line 
commenc from Southern Oregon on down into the Tracy/Tesla area. We are through the 
second of that. We have done corridor studies and we are now into routing studies. 
We've held public workshops throughout the whole north state to try to get as much public 
as we can into the process, and we'll be continuing on through the rest of this year 
and into late '86 just doing the environmental reports. TANC is the lead agency for the 
process. Western Power Administration is the lead agency for the EIS process on the 
Federal side. We are coordinating those two processes together to make sure they fit. 
Once we have gone through this process we then submit those documents to the in-
vestor-owned utilities who submit those to the Public Utilities Commission for their 
certification process. So we're not talking about a short process. We're talking about a 
long time in the study, both from the environmental, the economic, the feasibility of it, 
the engineering of it. These processes will take a long time and have a lot of input. 
The investor-owned utilities require the certification by the Public Utilities Commission. 
We in the public sector require that we go back to our communities and be able to con-
vince our communities that the financing of this line is in their best interest. The 
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city councils or district boards have the authority to go through that process with an 
ordinance and referendum. There are referendum available to the people of the community 
if they feel it is not economic or not beneficial for that entity not to participate. So 
we have a great deal of regulatory oversight, both in the public side and in the private 
side to get through with this project. 
In going through the questions, we've attempted in the paper I presented to you, to 
address all these questions. I don't know what degree you wish me to review them, but I 
can because we do not feel, as I've indicated, that we're talking about energy blackmail. 
We feel we're talking about a competition program, the availability to open up the total 
Western system. This opens up the marketplace throughout the system because of the 
increased transmission capacity. I might indicate with surpluses you're looking at the 
year 1991 for this line to come into being. Many of the studies in existence show that 
surpluses will be less here in 1991. There is a potential of surpluses not existing in 
the Northwest other than the fact that you have BC hydro. BC hydro, when certain North-
west surpluses still expect surpl~s, and that can be used to bring in our area. 
But we're talking about a great deal of variety in the numbers of entities we can 
deal with in the long-term future and we're looking at a transmission line that we're 
looking at 40 years or better of use, and so we're not looking at something that's just 
within the next 5, 10 or 15 years, but something that gives us a great deal of availability 
in resources that are both planned and under construction in the Northwest to date, and 
the BC hydro program of Site C, which they are very definitely talking about building. 
We're looking to the interconnection with Southern California with the diversity among 
our own state. We're looking at the ability, because of this function of cooperation 
among the utilities to work longer and harder at cooperation of utilities in the future, 
both as to sharing power supplies and power need. So we think those areas are fairly 
well identified in our project and we feel the project is well worth going forward with 
under those concepts. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Pugh, how will the municipal utilities transmit that power 
to the areas of need? Will wheeling be involved? 
MR. PUGH: Most of all of the publics today have wheeling contracts with either 
Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern Cal Edison, or other areas who own the transmission 
within the particular geographic sections. The power will be wheeled to the central 
substations and from those central substantions the, pursuant to existing contracts, be 
wheeled into the other areas. Part of the memorandum of understanding was that there 
wou1d he wtweling provided from Tesla to Midway on the Pacific Cas and Electric system, 
and then wheeling would be provided by Southern Cal Edison from their location at 
Midway to the southern cities for their share of this project power that comes down. So 
the wheeling contracts among the agencies here will be handled under current contractual 
rights which exist with the private-owned utilities who own the current transmission grid 
within the system in California. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The $64,000 question--SB 1430 that I've introduced calls upon the 
PUC to determine guaranteed minimal levels of power supply sufficient to justify the new 
construction, contractual limitations on the power adequate to ensure the cost effective-
ness of the project, and to demonstrate the availability of surplus power over the life of 
the project, and I note in your conclusion you recommend that that not be enacted. Now 
it seems to me that if everything has gone along the way you say it should go along, you'd 
have no problem with the legislation. What's the problem? 
MR. PUGH: Basically I think, Senator, the problem with the legislation is I see no 
way that we can today crystal ball the guarantee for 40 years that we're going to have all 
of those things that you're talking about on an open book. I think we're •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Then why do it? 
MR. PUGH: Because I think you have to take a look at what is likely to occur, but 
I'm not going to give you a guarantee that it's going to occur. I think the likelihood 
is there and the likelihood is different than a guarantee that is there. I think that 
your bill is asking us as publics and privates together to enter into some kind of a con-
tract where BPA guarantees or somebody there is going to guarantee that for 40 years they're 
go to supply you with "x" amounts of megawatts of power at such-and-such a rate, and I 
don t think we can do that in California. I couldn't get that out of PG&E today and I 
don't else, nor would they want to give one. And I don't think that anybody would 
want to enter into that type of a guaranteed program. 
We feel, based upon historical data, based upon projections and loads and on needs of 
all of the entities involved, that this matter is an economic and long-term benefit for 
the areas, but I can't give you a sure fire guarantee that that's going to be and I think 
this is the problem we have with that kind of legislation. 
CHAIRt1AN ROSENTHAL: Could you guarantee it for 15 years, not 40? 
MR. PUGH: Currently, under Federal law, no. Bonneville Power Administration cannot 
enter into a contract with term of a guarantee under Federal statutes. They're forbidden 
to do so. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, I have a problem trying to deal with somebody who created 
for themselves and can't get out of it, and so now you want me to deal with 
those people who built five plants which are never going to be in operation, only one of 
which is there, and now I'm supposed to deal with those people on some sort of a future 
relationship to provide at a reasonable cost on a guaranteed period of time for access. 
It's very difficult to deal with somebody who goes broke and now he wants me to say, 
, you know, I'm willing to spend $500 million from the ratebase to purchase some power 
from a source that I don't have confidence in." 
MR. IMBRECHT: Well, Senator, may I try that for a moment? Just a couple of things I'd 
point out to you. First, there is no way that Northwest is going to be able to bail 
out "WHOOPS" on the basis of any kind of deal that would go forward in California. It is 
simply economically impossible and I think that boogie man ought to be laid to rest at 
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the outset of any discussion. It's not in the cards. It's not the system, circum-
stances that will make it possible, etc., and there's not an entity in California that 
wouldn't turn their backs on such a deal and walk away, even with the investment that's 
been made to date. 
As a practical matter, it does have the prospect of increasing their revenue stream, 
but in no way in a volume necessary to solve Whoops. It may affect their ability to meet 
some of their Federal repayment issues and that's obviously one of the carrots that we 
were discussing with Senator Keene, but we're not talking about something in the magnitude 
that "WHOOPS" is, which $5 billion, give or take. 
Let's put some things in another perspective. $500 million for the transmission line, 
that's an upper scale limit. We're tried in all these discussions to air on the liberal 
side, if you will, based on some of the mistakes that are made in terms of other power 
projects in the past who underestimating what the cost is and then having to come back 
at a later point and swallow hard with egg on your face and say(Inaudibl0 cost overruns. 
As a practical matter though, we think the project will be substantially less costly than 
that. 
What does that mean in terms of comparisons? Well, if you want to talk Diablo, 
$5 billion for 2,200 megawatts, and even if we took the worst case scenario we're talking 
one-tenth of that for a capacity that's at least two-thirds, frankly, a little bit in 
excess of that. That's not to browbeat any project. It's simply to put thin~in a little 
bit of perspective. 
Finally, I do think it's likely that we're going to see some rate assurances that I 
believe will be sufficient to allow the PUC to make the kind of prudent judgement which 
they need to make with respect to investor-owned utilities. Whether it will be 15 years 
or not I doubt it will be that long because there are some exigencies in Federal law, but 
as the same time, I think that the PUC will and as they should look at the physical 
circumstances of the marketplace in the Northwest and I think they will understand as we do 
from those analyses, that the surpluses and the demand up there simply don't mesh. The 
surpluses are much greater than what the demand is and even if you prognosticate that all 
of their industries completely recover and all of the historic growth patterns and the 
rest of it, it 1 s only under those circumstances that you see the surplus dissipating in 
the early '90s. We're talking worst case scenario here when we're talking about the early 
'91 situation. 
Finally, the BC option, as we call it, is a very important one. British Columbia 
government has reversed a decades old policy of constructing generation capacity only for 
domestic consumption and then sale of any surplus they might have. Premier Bennett, after 
several meetings here in California with the Governor and myself and all of the senior 
executives of our major utilities announced about a year ago now that they would con-
struct for the purposes of export alone, and they already have two, and perhaps as many 
as three projects fully environmentally permitted and ready to go, assuming they have 
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access to the California marketplace. This is an issue of great importance to Canada. 
It's one which has been raised to the bilateral trade negotiations that were negotiated 
their prime minister and President Reagan in the of this year. It ranks from 
their perspective in terms of importance equal to the natural gas issues thatyou dis-
cussed this morning. I think that the economic necessities mean that BC will have access 
to the California marketplace. It's been important to the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power and other utilities in the past, and it will be important continuing into the 
future. 
One of the participants in our discussion is the most recently retired president of 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and I don't want to parrot any utility's viewpoint and 
I don't want in any sense to suggest that that's the case here, but he made a very 
telling comment at one of our most recent negotiating sessions. When he was talking 
largely to his own peers who were the senior executivesin the Northwest and said, "Gentle-
men, let's get down to the bottom line. If we're statesmen we can produce a deal that is 
beneficial to all the people in the Pacific Coast." Ultimately, I think any energy expert, 
whether you want to talk about Hunter and Amory Lovins, who represent one perspective 
infue community, or the utility community itself, I don't believe it makes sense funda-
for us to move towards a energy distribution system where we take 
advantage of the climactic differences between the regions rather than building and 
and building and operating like a small boat in an ocean all by ourselves. It 
doesn' make sense. The only impediment are human structures that we have 
created and it's frankly a challenge for all of us in public service to try to be states-
system that we know will benefit the people from British Columbia to the 
Mexican border, and perhaps Mexico as well. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: I m a bit confused by the response to Senator Rosenthal's question 
about SB 1430 because it seems to me that your answer was in the nature of the fact that 
the Northwest power producers are in such a sorry condition that they're not likely to 
a guarantee of a minimum level of power supply sufficient to justify the new 
construction, that they're not liable to want to ensure the cost effectiveness of our pro-
ject. 're not likely to be in a position to demonstrate the availability of surplus 
power over the life of the project. If that wasn't the position, maybe you could re-ex-
because I didn't understand it. It seems to me that if they are in such 
a situation to develop the California marketplace and the purchasing power and 
the needs of the California marketplace, that they're going to want to do exactly all of 
those That we can get them to do exactly the things that SB 1430 requires. Why 
is that not the case? 
}ffi. PUGH: Well, Senator Keene, I think the problem is I guess in perception as to 
what we say to guarantee. I say they will not and would not prudently enter into a 
fixed price, long-term contract if they could, and now we'll have to talk about the 
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investor-owned utilities or separate utilities other than Bonneville Power because they 
have impediments to those, Federal statute impediments to long-term contracts of that 
nature. 
SENATOR KEENE: Federal statute? 
MR. PUGH: They're impediments, they are required to have withdrawal provisions in 
their contracts, they're required to have limited time constraints on their contracts, all 
set by Federal statute. They cannot enter into a long-term fixed contract for a number of 
years. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, why then wouldn't you support SB 1430 to the extent that it's 
possible consistent with Federal law to do so, or why wouldn't you try to have Federal law 
changed to make it better for us to have a secure investment? 
MR. PUGH: Well, Senator, I'd like to get the line built by 1991 and what you're 
saying means we're being very realistic having dealt with just the process of going 
through, this line through Congress by itself. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, we can't pass a law. The Federal law is supreme. We can't pass 
a law that conflicts with Federal law which you're telling me now that SB 1430 has limita-
tions on it. Well, why can't we pass a bill up to the point of those limitations is 
effective in providing us what guarantees we can get? 
MR. PUGH: Well, Senator, I guess the basic problem I have is is it really necessary? 
Don't we already have enough regulatory proections with the Public Utilities Commission? 
SENATOR KEENE: You say so in your report. You say we already have extensive 
California regulatory agency involvement. You don't cite what it is and then you say, 
" ... and in fact regulatory approval was a critical path constraint to early development 
of the project." I don't really understand that and the Energy Commission has no 
siting authority, the PUC has no authority over municipal utilities. Where is all this 
regulatory authority that's being exercised on this project? 
MR. PUGH: Well, because this is not a municipal utility program by itself. This is 
a joint program in which the investor-owned utilities, as I indicated earlier, have an 
obligation and are required to go through the CPUC for their CPUC certification for 
their participation in this project. 
SENATOR KEENE: Only for their participation in the project. 
MR. PUGH: And as I went through the process we go through the environmental phases. 
We then present it for certification. We do not go to begin construction until after they 
have PUC approval. 
SENATOR KEENE: But the considerations there are environmental, they're not economic. 
MR. PUGH: No, they're consideration for certification are economic, environmental, 
everything. They have to certify that Pacific Gas and Electric and ... 
SENATOR KEENE: So you're talking about CPUC? 
MR. PUGH: That's right. 
SENATOR KEENE: I was going to your environmental impact report requirements. 
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MR. PUGH: They have to go to CPUC. In other words, TANC makes an environmental 
determination. Once we've made the environmental determination we then submit that with 
the investor-owned utilities who make application to the Public Utilities Commission for 
certification of the project so that they may participate in the project and participate 
in construction of the porject. We then have the process of CPUC certification which 
certifies their participation which includes the environmental, the financial, the ability 
for ratebase and everthing else with regard to the participation by Southern Cal Edison, 
San Diego Gas and Electric, and Pacific Gas and Electric. 
SENATOR KEENE: I don't know if what you're saying means that CPUC can reject this 
project for precisely the same reasons that fails to satisfy the requirements, the guaran-
tees that are required by SB 1430. Is that what you're saying? 
MR. PUGH: They would have that right without 1430 if they did not determine that, 
as I understand the rules, maybe Doug can help me here, but as I understand the rules 
with the Public Utilities Commission, they have the right to deny the certification of 
this project within their own existing guidelines on the process of feasibility, economics, 
need, use, whatever else you want. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Why don't we then--let's move now to Don Vial, the President 
of the PUC, for his presentation, and then in answer to the questions we've raised in 
terms of my bill, SB 1430. 
MR. VIAL: Yes, I do have a prepared statement that goes into the details of how we 
confront the cost effectiveness of the expanded intertie. I think what has been said thus 
far is a clear indication of the complexity of this issue. That it's not something that 
we can just deal with in isolation. I think Chairman Imbrecht has done a very good job 
in out the parameters of this and trying to bring it together. We in the PUC have 
a very strong interest in working very closely with the Energy Commission and putting our 
best foot forward in Caifornia to get the expanded tieline to accomplish all of the 
objectives that Chairman Imbrecht laid out. 
The problem that we have in the PUC is that we have to deal with a lot of reality 
in terms of the actual prices that we're assuming in dealing with the economic feasibility 
of these tielines. That's a pretty complex situation. It's quite obvious if you look at, 
if we had our druthers, as Chairman Imbrecht pointed out, that with all that capacity up 
there and our needs down here, it's to the advantage of both regions to have an expanded 
intertie so that we can interface with each other; and in fact if there were no barriers 
to competitive relationship, we'd be all home free and we'd be all very happy, but as 
Chairman Imbrecht pointed out, there are a lot of institutional barriers in between. And 
those institutional barriers have a lot to do with the price that is paid, both for firm 
and for nonfirrn energy and whether or not those lines in fact are going to be feasible. 
The truth of the matter is that we have to reach some accommodation with the North-
west and with Bonneville, particularly, to break down some of the institutional barriers 
that have cast a real shadow on the feasibility of this line. And in no sense can it be 
-59-· 
considered not feasible in the long-term, but on the other hand, if the barriers are not 
broken down, it could very well be a serious problem. And here again, this morning we 
were discussing gas. Gas prices are coming down. We don't know how long the bubble's 
going to last, but in fact, you know, the cost of generation with gas is coming down. 
I think that it's been alluded to there's the possibility for a win/win situation here 
in working out the problem is the fact that there's a big gap between the incremental cost 
of energy produced up North and our so-called avoided or incremental cost. There's a wide 
margin there and there's a lot of room for negotiation and settlement and in that context 
it's possible to determine whether or not these lines are going to be truly feasible. 
This is what my statement attempts to point out, just exactly how we are looking at these 
issues. 
Now it's important I think for everyone that is involved in the negotiations and 
certainly Chairman Imbrecht has been very much involved in this, along with Pacific North-
west and our own utilities, that they understand that we really have a public responsibility 
to get a some pretty hard figures. And if you can't tie it down with contracts, and you've 
heard what's been said about the contracts, there are problems there, that at least we 
should know what the ground rules are going to be in the future for dealing with price 
relationships. l think this is what we're talking about when we talk about the need for 
predictibility in rates for the future. If we can't tie down the specific contracts, at 
least to know what the ground rules are going to be and how we're going to adjust these. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That, and I understand what you're saying, but if in fact the 
rates in Washington had been reduced to their ratepayers in that area and increased to 
California ... 
MR. VIAL: Well, we've got a serious problem and all of us are involved right now 
before the FERC in trying to get a handle on the nonfirm rates. We're still discussing, 
believe it or not, before FERC, 1981 rates and we know what's happened to the nonfirm rates, 
you know, from 2 to 3 mills they've gone up to 23, 24 and they're going up. And what is 
important to recognize here is that this third line is going to have a lot of capacity 
available for nonfirm energy. When you work out the exchange relationships and work out 
the possibilities for firm energy on that line, there's still going to be a lot of capacity 
for nonfirm and it's really important to tie down that nonfirm rate if we can. In fact, 
I say that the time is right and I think everyone agree that we've put up with enough 
nonsense between--and this applies across the board. We really should be settling that 
nonfirm rate that's dangling before the FERC, come to some conclusions on it, lay out some 
ground rules on how we're going to deal with it in the future because we have approached 
our incremental cost of energy and as it stands now, some of the prices that are being 
advanced just don't look very good in terms of the feasibility of this project. So if 
we're going to really have a win/win situation and we're approaching our avoided cost 
prices, it means that the accommodation's going to have to mean some downward adjustment 
in that nonfirm rate. 
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There is a lot of room for negotiations here, as Chuck Imbrecht has pointed out. 
We've got to get on with it and we have to be together in this state on wltat's really 
to us. We want in the PUC to give reliable indicators of how we're looking at 
the feasibility so that no one is mislead, so that the Northwest reads us, hears us 
and clearly that those nonfirm rates are important just as the firm rates are going to be 
And that even if we had the additional capacity, if Bonneville is going to pur-
sue the kind of access policy on the intertie, that all of that excess capacity is not 
going to give us Canadian energy without a surcharge by the Northwest. And that's exactly 
what the PG&E and others are very concerned about. That we don't get surcharged in these 
relationships that get developed and this is again a question of how we start breaking 
down the institutional barriers one by one to make sure that we get some handle on what 
the rules are going to be for both firm and nonfirm energy in the future. And 
remember, we do have a lot of opportunities for exchange arrangements, but it's unlikely 
that we'll have the capacity for the exchange in their direction that there is the potential 
for buying energy from them. And the Canadians have clearly indicated that they want to 
invest in projects and sell us energy. We want that energy. It's important to the PG&E, 
for , in terms of their long-run goals. 
But let me just add one thing. That the Northwest really has to understand that there 
are really a lot of options for California here. That price is coming down on gas fired 
energy and also we have a lot of options in dealing with third party development. In the 
PUC we re going to be looking at what the long-term avoided costs is going to be for future 
energy It's really importnat for us to know what the arrangements can be 
with the Northwest and how much we can depend upon purchase power from the Northwest with 
some reliabil , and it's also important for the Northwest to know that we have options 
and we're not dependent upon them. I think that's what's going to make this arrangement 
work, if we can really settle down and they hear us loudly and clearly. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, since we've been told that you can't have a guaranteed con-
tract, what kind of assurances can we get that would signal to us that we're ready to put 
in $500 million and you as the regulators say, "Yes, that's a good deal and it's a cost 
benefit type of a project." What are we looking for? Word of honor, or what? 
MR. VIAL: No, I think that m terms of specific settlements, for example, I think that 
we should be able to settle right now the controversy over the nonfirm rate. We have a 
forum going in FERC and that would be an indication that if we can start chipping away at 
this essential problem of the nonfirm rate, we can then be looking at how we ought to be 
dealing with nonfirm rates in the future, having some understanding and agreement on how 
we're going to be dealing with incremental costs of the system up North, and our avoided 
costs, and how we're going to approach some kind of a win/win situation. That's the 
basis on which we need to proceed and I think that if we start chipping away at the 
nonfirm problem that has been blowing up in our face, we'll also start chipping away at 
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much of the basis for the intertie access policy that has restricted flow of energy to 
California on favorable terms. I think it's the kind of negotiating process where you need 
to have kind of a breakthrough. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is it a process whereby you get a formula based upon avoided costs 
or some other kind of things and so this relates to that, and if this goes up, that can 
go up, but if this stays down, then that will stay down? The final result is while it's 
not a guarantee, the result that you agree to in the formula produces a certain price that 
you can hang your hat on? Is that we're talking about? 
MR. VIAL: I'm no expert in this in details, and yes, that's the way I'm looking at 
it. I think Chairman Imbrecht looks at it in much the same way. We have expertise on 
our staffs, both the Energy Commission and the PUC, and of course the utilities have it 
also. We can get an understanding on how those formulas might work for the future. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So if you have a bill like Senator Rosenthal's which maybe relates 
to formulas or concepts which are real world concepts, and something happens to this, it 
has another effect here which is somewhat predictable, you can nail those down. 
MR. IMBRECHT: You just used the word that we've used in all of the discussions and 
that's predictability. That's not certainty because this is an uncertain world we live in 
in terms of energy costs and it's all tied together; and what the Arabs do affects the price 
of natural gas, which in turn affects our natural costs, which in turn affects the market, 
etc. I mean it's all a long, long string, but predictability is in fact the thing we're 
looking at. 
A little historic note, Senator Rosenthal, it's not so much what's happened per se 
since '81 and the variety of rate changes from Bonneville that we've called out in our 
electricity report and the PUC has talked about as well, it's the utter unpredictability 
in the manner in which they have treated California. The price increases have affected us. 
Basically we've gone from a cost-of-service philosophy in terms of what they've charged 
us, what it took them to generate it--obviously that's not a lot when the capital costs of 
a hydro project have already been amortized--to a what-the-market-will-bear formula, and 
the prices in the Northwest have also escalated. The prices to their consumers have gone 
up but not as quickly as they've gone up to the ratepayers in California. Does that mean 
that today our utilities are paying more for Northwest Power than they are for other 
generation? No, to the contrary. That's not the case. They're still paying less and 
that's the important thing to always keep focused. Yes, the price has gone way up but 
it's still less than anything else we've got in the system. 
What we're trying to do is ensure that there is predictability as to what those rate 
structures are going to be and to ensure that under no circumstances can we be placed in 
a position where those prices would go up beyond what domestic generation would cost us 
in California. That's the manner in which we protect the ratepayer. I think the issue in 
terms of your bill is not so much anybody disagreeing with the necessity for these issues 
to be considered. In fact what I think what we're trying to say is the PUC in fact 
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already is doing that and doing it within their own jurisdiction. And I think probably 
what it really would come down to is the question of semantics by which you define 
the types of issues that they ought to be satisfied with respect to before allowing 
investor-owned participation, rather than the concept whether in fact the PUC 
to ensure that they are making a prudent decision. 
In terms of the publicly-owned utilities, I think the important thing to remember is 
that we're talking about elected officials with a constituency of their own and that's 
largely the regulatory check on decisions that are undertaken by the publics. You can 
draw your own conclusions whether you think that's adequate or inadequate or not, but 
that's in essence the circumstance we find ourselves in. 
MR. VIAL: Well, we don't need the authority of the legislation. It's clear that we 
have the authority. We have suggested some amendments that would from our point of view 
make it more compatible with the kinds of problems that we're talking about here, and at 
the same time make it possible for the Legislature to indicate the kinds of things that 
you want us to take into account. Basically, we are trying to do all the things that you 
are suggesting in your bill. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, on that point, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE: Then obviously the legislation doesn't impower you, it restrains you. 
It causes the PUC to adhere to certain findings before going ahead with the certificate 
of--what do they call it, convenience of necessity, or whatever it's called--it requires 
that you do certain first. 
MR. VIAL: That's true. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, now you say, "Well, we're going to do those things anyway," and 
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I trust my fellow commissioners, I understand all of that concept. My question, though, 
goes back, my question, though, Don, goes back to what was said by Mr. Pugh and that was 
that you can't get these things out of the Northwest Power people, out of Bonneville and 
the others. So if you can't get them, they can't get them, and we can't get them legis-
latively, how are you going to be able to get them? With all the good faith in the world 
that the commission might have. 
MR. IMBRECHT: You can't get what's defined in the bill, but what we're saying is you 
can get adequate assuances to ify the line and that's what I was talking about in 
terms of semantics. Let me offer a couple of things that I believe we can get, and 
frankly, in my own have to get in order for anyone to be confident about going 
forward whether it be public or private utilities in the state. We need predictability 
in the rate structure from Bonneville Power Administration. That's a statement that's 
been delivered to them with such consistency that they must be mind numb ... 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay, but how are you going to get it? The Rosenthal bill suggests 
a way to get it. How are you going to get it? That's not semantics. 
MR. IMBRECHT: Frankly, they have a lot of flexibility about how they structure 
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their rates. They are both a utility and a PUC all rolled into one. They announce a rate 
structure, then the administrator goes and sits as a member of the PUC and decides whether 
his own judgment was prudent or not. That's literally the way it works. And then it goes 
before FERC and that's sort of an independent check, but of course, they've got too many 
TVA's and BPA's to worry about and so it's largely--unless there's an agrievous violation 
of the process--it's upheld. 
But there are also political levers in the Northwest and that has to do with the 
economics of them being able to continue to sell to California. There are investor-owned 
and public utilities up there ... 
SENATOR KEENE: But once the pipeline is built, once the pipleine is built that 
leverage is lost because we're not going to make a white elephant out of the pipeline, so 
MR. IMBRECHT: It isn't going to be built without those kinds of predictability 
checks built in ••. 
SENATOR KEENE: But it's those kinds, it's those kinds that worry me. 
MR. IMBRECHT: Some of the kinds of things we're talking about frankly, if you want 
to get down to the nitty-gritty, there are ways of doing it. Bonneville is tied to the 
Preference Act on the Federal level in terms of their ability to cut off agreements and 
so forth, recall power, etc. That doesn't mean that their investor-owned utilities or 
their other publics are tied to that same set of restrictions and there is some discussion 
underway, for example, for them to in essence market the power to the Northwest, in essence 
have Bonneville sell their share to the lOU's and they in turn sell to California. And 
suffice it to say, there are mechanisms, some of which are being spawned right now by 
utility attorneys, etc. We're pretty confident that such approaches can creatively be 
embraced that will allow the PUC to make the kinds of findings that do justify the line. 
I'd also encourage you to take a look at the history of the first two Northwest 
Interties where similar questions were raised and there's a very sense of public record on 
this issue, and also take a look at the history of what the benefits to the two regions 
have been. The problem from the Northwest's perspective has been, part of it in the last 
couple of years has been we're getting even for a perception that somehow California took 
advantage of the situation too long. We negotiated prices on the spot market. We were 
three and four mills kilowatt hour for energy while their own ratepayers were paying 
18 and 19. You can obviously understand the oolitical oroblems and certainly within 
that reason. 
SENATOR KEENE: And now we're paying 26 to 30 mills? 
MR. IMBRECHT: A lot of that has been dissipated today and I think that it's impor-
tant to look at it in terms of the entire historical context. This is really not a good 
forum to explain all that ..• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No. 
MR. IMBRECHT: but I'll make myself available to explain in detail to respond to 
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those questions. 
MR. VIAL: May I make a point? Senator, you are obviously on the crucial issue and 
you're really--we in the PUC must deal with that issue and deal with it effectively. Now 
first of all, it is possible for the utilities, the private utilities to enter into agree-
ments with the other IOUs up there. The problem is to get access to that line. All the 
intertie capacity in the world isn't going to break down the access policy of Bonneville 
unless we work out an arrangement to break that down. That's an integral part of 
making this line feasible and in the process we feel we'll get some price adjustment. 
What I want to point out to you that when you talk about feasibility and what we're 
looking at as I point out in my statement--the Northwest's analysts talk in terms of 
options of 50 mills per killowatt hour. Now if you look at that just for a moment, the 
cost of the line is going to be just 25 mills. Now between that and 50 mills you can see 
what the maximum amount might be for this thing to have feasibility is that there isn't 
much room. You can get gas-generated energy today at 30 mills or close to 
it. So it's this kind of a process that we're going to go through. It's really impor-
tant for us in working with the Energy Commissioniliat the PUC gives good signals on how 
we look at cost effectiveness. That's why I took the pains in laying it out in this 
statement before you today. Those are the kinds of things that we'll be looking at. But 
the problems are not insurmountable. I really feel that the big problem in large part is 
being able to break down that access policy because if we can break that down,with the 
additional capacity there'll be a lot of room for the private utilities to negotiate and 
the feasibility of these lines greatly depends upon those negotiations with the private 
ut ities and the price that they can get firm and nonfirm energy at. 
SENATOR KEENE: But your whole statement is replete with arbitrariness and bias on 
the part of Bonneville and a failure to protect on the part of FERC. 
MR. VIAL: That's right. 
SENATOR KEENE: That's all over the place here and you're telling us not to worry. 
[Laughs.] 
MR. VIAL. No, I'm not telling you not to worry. I'm saying that we have to be to-
gether on this in our negotiations and I can assure you that we're working very closely 
with the Energy Commission and the others to make sure that we get our interests forward 
because we could be taken to the cleaners on this thing. 
MR. IMBRECHT: Both the PUC and we and our utilities have been taking utterly con-
sistent positions in regulatory and judicial proceedings relative to these isses. Now 
admittedly, it's been a frustrating circumstance because as I explained to you the BFA 
is an entity largely unto itself. That's why I'm convinced this is only going to happen 
as a result of hard ball and to put it to you bluntly, political negotiations. And if 
they're left to act in an environment that is somehow a vacuum is not going to happen. We 
are doing our best, I assure you, and I'll be happy to detail to you privately what the 
steps are that are underway to ensure that the realities of this situation are clearly 
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understood by the parties in the Northwest, as well as by our own. But we're not going 
to go forward, period, unless this is a cost effective investment for our people. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, I think we could make some recommended changes in the 
legislation because really what I'd like to do is send a message. 
MR. PUGH: I think that's very true, Senator. One thing I'd like to comment on also 
is that one of the problems historically you've gotten is again the access is limited to 
one location, to one set of tielines. The concept of the new line was to give multiple 
ties to that line outside of the jurisdiction of Bonneville totally and if we can get 
multiple ties so we have direct access to other utilities, that again developes the 
potential for competition, develops the potential to access other utilities as opposed to 
Bonneville and gives us some ability to work on the price on that basis. And that's one of 
the concepts of this line as to the connection point being shown and the negotiations on 
that connection point. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: To what extent does Bonneville really need us? 
MR. PUGH: I think if you look at their rate repayment structure and their rate 
repayment program, with the power--if they don't sell us power that's being developed up 
there and spill that power or dump it, they still have to make the same amount of money to 
make the repayment program. And to make that repayment program, then it means they have to 
up the rates to their ratepayers or to their industrial users or the DSis or whatever else 
you wnat up there. So they need to maximize their sales to be able to quantify and gen-
erate the revenues they need to make their repayment program and with the (Inaudible) 
rearing it's head again back in Washington, D.C., I think they're going to be looking 
even harder at that. And that's an area that we have to be careful about too because if 
the repayment programs come back into effect then we have another area we have to look at 
very carefully. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is there a lot of pressure for the Federal Government on them to 
repay? 
MR. PUGH: Yes, there is. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. I'd like to call upon Mr. Oglesby, PG&E, to get 
your input. 
MR. DOUGLAS OGLESBY: Thank you very much. One of the advantages of being last on 
the panel is that my colleagues have so thoroughly ventilated many of the critical issues, 
but I think I can provide a bit of a perspective from the standpoint of at least one 
investor-owned utility. 
Very simply, in our opinion the third line is seriously threatened by the anti-com-
petitive behavior of PPA. PPA controls most of the intertie access in the Northwest and 
therefore controls the flow of power into California. Through it's access policy it's 
eliminated price competition among the Northwest sellers of energy, and has prevented the 
ability of all utilities in California to be able to shop around for the cheapest source 
of energy. 
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As important, if not more important, it has cut off access to, as Chairman Imbrecht 
pointed out, BC Hydro which wants to build new facilities solely for export and that 
really is not going to happen unless we can get access to BC Hydro. Quite simply, BPAs 
policies could increase electric costs to California consumers as much as $100 million 
annually. In the face of these unwarranted price increases which further subsidize the 
consumers of Northwest energy, which if I'm not mistaken already enjoy the lowest energy 
prices in the country, I think it's safe to say that there is a serious question about 
the economic justification for the third line. 
To give you an example, assuming only nonfirm energy is available to the California/ 
Oregon Transmission Project and no capacity of benefits, Northwest energy would have to be 
priced at no more than 12 mills per killowatt hours in today's costs in order for the 
project to break even. We've provided some information to President Vial and his people 
and has a lot of discussions with everyone here on these issues. 
BPAs access policy has precluded the existence of power at that cost. In fact, the 
cheapest nonfirm energy in the Northwest is now above ..• 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. A clarifying question? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE: In order for the project to break even nonfirm energy would have to 
be priced at 12 mills? 
MR. OGLESBY: No more than 12 mills. I'm sorry, yes. No more than 12 mills. 
MR. In addition to the fixed cost of 25? 
MR. OGLESBY: That's correct. Those are embedded costs. I'm talking about just 
nonfirm energy. 
SENATOR KEENE: And the current rate is what? 
MR. OGLESBY: It exceeds 20 mills. 
SENATOR KEENE: So they would have to reduce the rate? 
MR. OGLESBY: That's right. That's assuming no capacity benefits. You're trying to 
justify the line solely on energy. Each participant in the project has to justify the 
line on its own particular needs. One entity may need peaking capacity, some other 
entity may need long-term firm power, other entities may try to justify it on the basis 
of taking advantage of seasonal diversity exchanges. We've talked about our exchanging 
capacity during our low period which would be in the winter for their capacity during 
their low period which would be in the summer, and there seems to be the possibility of a 
mesh there. Others are looking at things like capacity reserves. Frankly, that's how 
PG&E is trying to justify the third line is something that we've called capacity reserves. 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm somewhat confused because what is the likelihood, first of all, 
of BPA cutting in half its current charge for nonfirm energy and keeping it there? 
MR. OGLESBY: I would say not great. 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. Then these other benefits, these offsetting benefits. How do 
they relate to the requirement of 12 in order to make the project pay? 
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MR. IMBRECHT: Because each entity may not need to justify the project solely on the 
basis of nonfirm energy. PG&E has a surplus of capacity. That's the same issue with 
respect to cogeneration construction in their service territory. They've got Diablo, 
they've got Helms in their system currently. They don't need capacity so they're looking 
at this line from an energy standpoint. Other utilities, however, need capacity. Then 
there is a value associated with purchasing capacity, as well as energy from the Northwest. 
We're really talking about two different commodities as a practical matter and he's 
referencing now what would make this line from a nonfirm energy standpoint attractive to 
Pacific Gas and Electric. 
MR. OGLESBY: If all we were looking for to justify the line was nonfirm energy, 
then you're right, Senator. They'd have to cut their costs by roughly half in order for 
us to be able to justify the line. We would like to take advantage of nonfirm energy at 
times when we need it, but there are other things that we're looking for in the line as 
well. I mention a reserve capacity. That's something in the longer term that we think 
we can benefit from. We don't know if that's available at an economic price in the 
Northwest. We've been in discussions with BPA concerning that. In fact, as recently as 
last week ago today I was in Portland talking with BPA trying to outline some kind of 
contract, establish some sort of principles that would enable us to look like we're 
going to have something economic. But I'm not really optimistic as I sit here talking 
to you that we're going to be able to come up with something that's economic, but the one 
thing I can assure you is that I have absolute confidence that President Vial and his 
colleagues on the Public Utilities Commission are not about to certify Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company's participation in this project unless we can make that kind of showing 
and I think that's really the important point. In fact, that in my judgment is one of 
the flaws in SB 1430. 
lt seems to me, ancl you identified it, Senator, that rather than authorizing the 
PubLic Utilities Commission to consider other things than it does not now consider, it 
constrains the PUC. It does that, but it also constrains the ability of the utilities 
here to negotiate cost effective arrangements. The investor-owned utilities, as we 
talked about, are subject to the review of the PUC and we can't commit construction funds 
to projects without first obtaining a certificate. The PUC will evaluate all of the 
concerns that you've listed in your bill, plus many more. The problem as I see it though 
is it restricts our ability to negotiate contracts. It would preclude certain economical 
energy purchases, such as non firm energy purchases, because those can't be arranged years 
in advance. I can't sit here and negotiate a contract with BPA, or indeed any Northwest 
utility, BPA or not, for nonfirm prices in 1995. I probably can't even do it for next 
year. That's something that available in eftect on the spot market. 
In fact, if I can refer back and Chairman Imbrecht was absolutely correct when he 
mentioned the benefits on the existing Pacific intertie. One reason the existing Pacific 
intertie was such great benefit to the consumers to California was we were able to take 
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advantage of nonfirm energy prices, that is to say hydroelectric-generated energy, in the 
1970s during period of rapidly escalating oil and gas prices, and we didn't have to use 
our fossil fuel power plants in order to generate that power. We could get it from the 
Northwest. Now if SB 1430 had been the law at the time the Pacific intertie was con-
structed and we had to make the kind of showing required under SB 1430 in order to obtain 
a certificate from the Public Utilities Commission, then the chances are we would not have 
been able to avail ourselves of those great benefits during the 1907s. In fact, there's 
a possibility the line wouldn't have been built at all. 
There's been a lot of discussion here with reference to Mr. Pugh about the, how the 
municipalities fit into SB 1430, but unless I misread the bill, I don't think SB 1430 
applies to municipal-owned utilities. It applies only to investor-owned utilities because 
it's triggered on the certification of the Public Utilities Commission who's jurisdiction 
does not extend to municipal utilities. I think that's problem for a couple of reasons. 
The first is it may well restrict unduly investor-owned utilities from taking advantage 
of some of these nonfirm energy benefits and other flexibilities to adapt to changing 
economic conditions, but it doesn't restrict the muncipal utilities from doing that. That 
can result in the municipal utilities, and I certainly don't begrudge them getting as 
many benefits as they can for their own ratepayers, but the fact is the investor-owned 
utilities do represent over 70 percent of the citizens of California. We would not be 
able to take advantage of those benefits. 
I think, and I think this is a very important point, that any state policy or any 
state should include all utilities because the important point as I see it is 
to strengthen the bargaining position of the utilities in California. I'm not sure 
SB 1430 is the vehicle to achieve a result that we all want to achieve, and that's 
to ensure that the line isn't built if it's not economic. Conversely, that it is built if 
it is economic and one doesn't follow from the other, believe me. And secondly, that we're 
some fashion able to influence the energy policies in the Northwest. 
There may well be a role for the Legislature to play. We've done a lot of thinking 
in our house and talked with some of President Vial's staff about the possibility of some 
sort of state supervised negotiation by utilities as a group. We really haven't developed 
it. This is a thorny problem trying to infuence Northwest policies, but if there was some 
fashion that all of the utilities could join together, fight a cartel with a strong nego-
tiat position, then maybe we could have some kind of influence on the Northwest. I 
would think that the thing we would want to do here is to find some mechanism for 
increasing the bargaining position of all of the utilities in the south. If you don't 
include all of the utilities then you have a risk of BPA being able to play off one group 
another and that's not going to help anybody. It would be to the ultimate detri-
ment of all of our citizens. 
I think one point that President Vial made is the congruent interests of everybody in 
California. I really want to underscore that because the interests in this area of the 
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investor-owned utilities or the municipal utilities, of the Energy Commission or the 
Public Utilities Commission, clearly the Legislature as reflected in your bill, Senator 
Rosenthal. Everybody in California is the same, is absolutely identical here and that's 
to try to get the cheapest possible power and much fairer allocation of benefits between 
the North and the South and get those benefits down to California. We're trying to reduce 
energy prices to 20-some-odd-million people in California and we all need to work together 
on that. 
One final note and I'll shut up. There's been some talk about the efforts we need to 
take at the FERC in an effort to try to infuence the nonfirm energy price. I certainly 
wholeheartedly support those efforts and some of our lawyers have been litigating with 
attorneys for the Energy Commission and the Public Utilities Commission at the rate pro~ 
ceedings in the FERC, but unfortunately, whether it's a standard of review or politics or 
whatever, we haven't been all that successful at the FERC. To give you one example that 
I think sticks out. President Vial mentioned the 1981-1982 nonfirm hearings. Unless I'm 
1nistaken, I believe the initial decision of the administrative law judge in that case in 
fact reversed BBA's decision on the nonfirm rate but reversed it because it was not too 
high, but because it was too low; and recommended a higher rate and that's now on exception 
to the commission and we don't know yet know whether the commission is going to buy that. 
Tlte problem is that the standard of review of the FERC in reviewing nonregional rate pro-
ceedings of BPA is not what we would likeit to be. But still that's the one forum we have 
and we just finished litigating a 1983 nonregional rate case. We don't yet have a 
decision and in fact I think the briefs are just being submitted this week, but we hope 
for a better result. I'm not optimistic though. I'll be happy to answer any questions. 
MR. PUGH: Excuse me, one factual issue, Senator, before you leave if I might? I 
think the number was bandied around about the cost of the line and it actually comes out 
somewhere between the 5 and 10 mill range is the cost rather than the 25; 5 to 10 mills is 
the cost of the line. 
MR. lMBRECHT: What that does to the arithemetic does not require a halving of 
existing nonfirm rate but basically suggests that existing nonfirm rate is roughly in the 
ballpark, and I don't want to use that as a negotiating position going into the discussions 
with the Northwest, but I think you ought to know the true cost (Inaudible) and that's 
based on an assumption of $400 million cost to the line which is neither high nor low. 
Thelowis about a quarter of a million, the high is about $500 million. In either case, 
we're not talking 25 mills by any stretch. 
And I would say finally that the point that has been of use to California to date in 
these discussion is we have had a pretty historic sense of unanimity between the interests 
in California in terms of dealing with the Northwest and that's why we've gotten at least 
as rar as we have in the last two years. Two years ago L can LL' 11 you that there were ~J 
lot more people on the horizon that were naysayers and frankly didn't think we'd ever get 
a memorandum of understanding. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes, I have a question 
available. 
Mr. and Mr. Vial as soon as he's 
MR. VIAL: Excuse me, I was don't think we should be over the cost 
of this line. My reference to the 25 mills is on the top of page, aboutthe fifth page. 
I do refer to the basis for the calculation so that if there's disagreement on that, I 
think we ought to get to it. I don't think that should hang us up. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: We didn't get a copy of that. 
MR. VIAL: I can tell you what we said and if this is incorrect, talk to our staff 
about it. I say at the bottom of the page: "If present BPA policies continue adding the 
high EPA rate for nonfirm energy to the cost of the line might well make the third line a 
very benefit for the Northwest and a net added cost for California. The cost to 
California utilities for California's of the line would be over $500 million. If 
the third line carries 3.1 billion kilowatt hours of power annually, costs of the line 
can be translated to 25 mills per kilowatt hour. Adding the BPA rate for nonfirm energy 
of 23 mills to that 25 mills, cost of the line gives a total of nearly 50 mills." Now 
that's what's in there now. If it's incorrect, I think we ought to correct it. 
MR. OGLESBY: I think an point--I don't have the data with which to calcu-
late the cost of the line in mills per kilowatt hour--but one point, and I meant to make 
this earlier in response to your , I think it was yours, Senator Rosenthal, about 
the wheel obligation for the municipal utilities. The MOU for the third line obligates 
Pacific Gas and Electric to 1,000 megawatts of bidirectional transmission 
from Tesla to Midway substations, as well as obligating PG&E to provide wheeling services 
1 of the participants so can receive the benefit of their allocation. But in 
order to meet obl ion south of Tesla, our initial studies--admittedly preliminary, 
're certainly this direction--will us to meet that obligation 
HOU and meet other that we already have by a number of upgrades in 
our system south of Tesla. And these upgrades include what appears to be about an 85-mile 
additional stretch of 500 KV line between Los Banos and Gates, which in effect completes 
a three lines all the way from Tesla to That additional line segment we estimate 
to cost about $130 million. That may account for what some of that disparity 
between 10 and 25 mils, if that's being rolled in, and it also may account for the overall 
costs we've heard today in excess of $500 million when the feeling of the participants in 
the California/Oregon Transmission Project is that the project from Tesla north would be 
closer to $400 million than the $500 million. I add that only to ... 
MR. IMBRECHT: Even if that were the case that would not account for the disparity. 
~ffi. OGLESBY Certainly not. 
MR. IMBRECHT: And I think that what we're talking about is a difference in terms of 
assumptions about the operating characteristics of the line, whether in fact it would be 
loaded a quarter, half, or most of the time, and I think that what we're being told right 
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now the basic difference in assumption is that out of better than 8,000 hours in a year, 
the assumption in the testimony offered President Vial assumes loading of the line only 
about 20 percent of the time. And I guess I would say that that is the most possible 
conservative approach to considering the cost of the capital in the line to be rolled into 
the operat cost. That certainly would not be the case if you were to look at existing 
lines any stretch of the imagination since 're used in excess of 90 percent of the 
time. 
MR. VIAL: We haven't been ... hearings on this thing. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand, yes. 
MR. VIAL: What we are attributing I think is the cost of, allocating the cost of the 
Northwest cost to the line. That's the reason why ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Now I have just one question. Is the 3.1 billion kilowatt 
hours off power annually, is that low? 
MR. IMBRECHT: Very. Very low. 
MR. OGLESBY: It appears to be 20 percent. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's about 20 percent of what the line could carry? 
MR. IMBRECHT: That's right and that's where the difference in cost--that's what it 
all boils down to. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Are there are indications that we will take more from the 
Northwest than that? 
~ill. IMBRECHT: Oh, much more. 
MR. PUGH: Well again, that would depend upon the individual needs of each partici-
pant. It's hard to say. 
MH. UiBRECHT: I think we could safely say that it's unlikely that it's going to ever 
be utilized 20 percent of the time. 
MR. PUGH: Overall, I think that's certainly true. There was an early late 1983, 
early '84 study by the publics alone in Northern California with Western Area Power 
Administration, and the assumption on their program was that we would use that 1,600 
full time within the publics and it was cost beneficial to the publics under our then 
economic scenario just to use it on the basis of summer peak capacity without bringing in 
surplus energies or nonfirm sales. And so on thatcriteria the publics had made a decision 
to go forward even if the investor-owned decided at that time in the negotiations not to 
participate with us. As it came out, the participation was agreed to among all the 
parties. Everyone felt they had access and need for it and that created the memorandum 
of understanding went forward there, but the publics had reviewed that as a full use line 
for themselves at those kinds of prices and costs and was economic. 
MR. IMBRECHT: One final point, the point was made by PG&E and I think it's important 
to emphasize in terms of the role the Energy Commission's played in this, along with the 
Governor's Administration and that is from the outset of these discussions, which basically 
in the Spring of 1983 and really got underway in the summer of '83, is that a basic 
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principle was enunciated at the beginning that every utility in California would be 
invited to participate and the net result is that every utility, with the exception of a 
couple of very small municipals and L.A.W.P. which was already in the BC upgrade project 
with Edison, did ultimately become signators to the ect. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Is there the slightest possibility that if the Public Utilities 
Commission rejected the certificate of public convenience and necessity, that the munici-
pal utilities would be able to go it alone and that the project would be economically 
feasible under those circumstances? 
MR. PUGH: I would say that as a result of our reports in late '83, early '84, that's 
a possibility. What it is today? We have not done the economic studies today. There is 
in the documentation a program that if the certification is not allowed to anyone of or all 
of the investor-owned utilities, that under the MOU and documents currently the existing 
participants may then sit down and determine whether or not to proceed on the program or 
not. And again, the economic studies are being conducted, commencing now both as to 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 studies and those economic studies will show a lot more as to whether 
or not that would be a viable alternative at the time if that was the occurrence. 
SENATOR KEENE: So the statement of yours in your report, your statement here that 
regulatory approval is a critical path constraint to early development of the project is 
not totally air tight? 
MR. PUGH: That is with regard to early approval of the project. There is a time-
frame ... 
SENATOR KEENE: So the >vord "early" is key? 
MR. PUGH: The word "early" is very key. There is a timeframe and, Doug, I forget 
what the timeline is. If you don't get certification within--what was the final period? 
MR. OGLESBY: Twenty months after receipt of the ... 
MR. PUGH: Twenty months after application ... 
MR. OGLESBY: ..• after the final record of decision on the EIR, then the parties 
would sit down and see if they could renegotiate a new project development agreement. 
SENATOR KEENE: What in your judgment is the practical possibility of the municipal 
utilities doing it on their ov..'ll if the PUC denies the certificate of convenience and 
neces 
MR. OGLESBY: We have not made an analysis of that. To very candid and I'm sure it 
doesn't come as a surprise to Arch, it's something that we need to consider. But I don't 
think we've come to any judgment now as to whether the project would be viable if the 
investor-owned utilties did not receive the certificate. 
SENATOR KEENE: Is it going to cause you to urge rash judgments on the part of the 
Public Utilities Commission to approve your involvement? [Laughs.] 
MR. OGLESBY: I like to think we would urge rash judgments from the Public Utilities 
Commission. [Laughter.] 
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SENATOR KEENE: Well, I would ike to think so too, but I can't. 
MR. VIAL: I should out that that is a consideration that we would bear in mind. 
1 mean, after all. Whether it's 70 or 80 percent of the ratepayers in California are 
ratepayers to the IOU, lOU's, and the balance to the muni's. If in fact there are mutual 
bene its to be obtained an interregional relationship, it's really important for us in 
the PUC to bear that in mind so that teh IOU ratepayers wilJ a] so be ab] e to participate. 
Therefore, it might modify to some extent excatly how we app 
t ion. 
the numbers to the situa-
SENATOR KEENE: Well, there might be some very serious legislative concerns at that 
point since we're already bailing out the muni's, having to bail them out more might 
create a problem. 
MR. OGLESBY: Well, one thing we have to go through a very comprehensive and complex 
economic analysis both in order to make our own decision in the company about the economic 
justification of the line, and then to present that to the Public Utilities Commission as 
part of our application for certification. One of the things we're considering are the 
implications to our ratepayers, almost 4 million electric customers, 10 million people in 
the northern two-thirds of California. What are the implications to all of those people 
if we are not a participant in the line and the line nevertheless goes forward? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, before we wind up I'd like to suggest that we haven't heard 
from the other major investor-owned utility and I'd like them to send the committee answers 
to the questions that we've asked both PG&E and others so that we can have the input of 
Southern Cal Edison as well. 
ln closing, for those of you involved in our hearing tomorrow, please note that we 
will be meeting in this room, not the Morgan Center as previously scheduled. We'll 
probably have to have somebody over at the Morgan Center sending people here for those 
who didn't get that word. 
I want to thank participants. I think it was a good hearing and I think we had, 
both the morning and afternoon session, plenty for the committee to digest. Thank you 
very much. 
--ooOoo--
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